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The task of this research is to demonstrate a multilevel secure interface between a
system operating at multiple security levels and other untrusted systems operating at a
single security level. Without a trusted interface device, these systems cannot be
electronically connected. All communications between the systems must be done
manually with all information transfer being reviewed by a security officer. Only
releasable information is printed or stored in a removable medium and hand carried to
the other system. In contrast, a trusted, multilevel secure guard can connect untrusted
systems electronically and control the release of sensitive information. This task, will
demonstrate the ability of a multilevel trusted system to interface with untrusted
systems operating at different levels of security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As automation increases and our reliance on computer systems grows, it becomes
increasingly important to ensure that the information entrusted to these systems is
protected. Techniques to address information protection can be as simple as
procedural controls, or as complicated as controls embedded in the hardware and
software of the computer system itself. Each technique addresses a particular
information protection problem and assumes that other techniques are available to
solve problems in other areas. This thesis addresses some of the problems involved
with computer security, specifically, computer security of tactical data systems. The
goal of this thesis is to provide an introduction to the concept of computer security, to
focus on a particular area where computer security is vital— Marine tactical data
systems, and to demonstrate how a secure guard may be added to Marine tactical data
systems as a "first step" toward designing a multilevel secure computer system to
protect information vital to command and control of Marine forces.
Chapter I of this thesis provides an overview of computer security and introduces
Marine tactical data systems, their interoperability, and their interface requirements.
Chapter II provides a basic understanding of multilevel computing systems, specifically,
the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer System. Chapter III describes the
development of a demonstration of the Gemini Trusted Computing Base (TCB) used as
a guard between Marine tactical data systems operating at multiple levels of security.
Chapter IV discusses the implementation of the demonstration, its testing and "lessons
learned". Finally Chapter V provides conclusions drawn from this research and
recommendations for further study.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Computers are here to stay. They are permeating every facet of society from
games to managing information critical to our national security. Information has
become a strategic resource. The availability of computers has moved us from an
industrial society to an information society. Our CI posture is critically affected by
and dependent on computers. Their speed and unfailing accuracy make them well
suited to the massive information handling tasks in battle management for:
• Shared information storage, retrieval and dissemination
• Rapid and common processing systems
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• Efficient and reliable communications process control [Ref. 1: p. 271].
Relying on computers to carry out timely and reliable information transfer raises
the question, can they be trusted?. Trust and reliability in computer software and
hardware are not necessarily synonymous. First, what vulnerabilities must we guard
against and next, what is needed to bridge the gap between the plain vanilla computer
and the trusted computer?
Rapid advances of hardware and software technologies in microelectronics,
computers, network systems and man-machine interfaces are making major changes in
today's CI architecture approaches. Modern CI systems will be implemented by new
architectures consisting of a large number of networks, computers, processors and
input/ output devices. However, many of the computer and network systems used to
support modern C^I technologies must handle sensitive information and work in a
completely secure environment. Information used with today's CI systems must be
protected.
To better understand the role of computers in information protection, let us look
at how our evolving use of computers has brought with it computer security problems.
This will help determine what can and cannot be done to protect our newest strategic
resource.
Until the mid-1950's, computers were commonly dedicated to one user at a time
and security was of minor concern. The user either worked on his own behalf or as a
programmer for someone else. The computer power was limited. With reasonable
planning, the user kept the machine busy for his period of use. The jobs were typically
processing of numerical data which required only a limited amount of software and
data. The user brought with him all the data (card deck) and no one else could affect
the machine while he used it. If he had sensitive data, he could easily purge the small
bit of information in the machine and take all of his data and results with him when he
finished. Thus, with no sharing of the machine and no sharing of data, the user was in
control of his own security. [Ref. 2]
Later, in the 1960's more powerful and much more expensive computers could
not be dedicated to just one user. The human was just too slow to efficiently employ
the machine and usage expanded. Software packages called operating systems or
monitors evolved and computers were shared by multiple users. In this mode, the
machine was under the physical control of a computer operator, not the user. Most
common and useful operating systems employ multiprogramming or timesharing so that
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several jobs may run simultaneously. Regardless of the operating system particulars,
the computer is in control of its resources, not the user. In this environment, the
nature of computer security becomes quite clear. The operating system software is
more privileged in some sense than the user. This poses no problem as long as the
operating system is trusted. It did not take long to discover that a malicious user could
easily penetrate the operating system and cause it to share its privileges. [Ref. 2]
An answer to this problem of non-existent internal security is to eliminate any
user who is not authorized access to the information. This method of security can be
effective, but it has two disadvantages. It can be quite expensive, since it limits sharing
of the computer's resources to a common need to know. It can also encourage
imprudent risks because of the temptation to increase sharing by treating all users as
honest when they may have no need to know or may even be hostile. The distinctive
characteristic of a shared system is that security can be provided by isolating the users
into compatible groups that share machine resources.
Since the mid-1960's, computers have been increasingly used for this purpose in
information management. The principle capability of these systems is access control
vice processing. These controls can be as simple as distinguishing whether a user can
read only or both read and write a file to more complex controls over access—such as
those implicit in the military classification levels.
For example, wargaming centers often have a need to provide war games at
several levels of classification using a single software system and a large classified data
base. Frequently the users, who are expected to participate through hands-on use of
the computer, have no clearance or clearance at a level lower than might be required.
This forces downloading of the sensitive portions of the data base, a disruptive practice
in a wargaming center. The use of a trusted guard could control the access to the data
base and allow operation of games with various levels of classification using a single,
fixed classified data base.
Information systems and networks are rapidly expanding in the private sector as
well as the military. The available isolation techniques are not workable—since the
need is to provide controlled (shared) access via the computer. This means that we
have no alternative but to develop internal controls for the computer itself-new, more
powerful, and trusted operating systems.
From this perspective, we can see that there are basically two kinds of responses;
limit the opportunity to do harm and, in doing so, we reduce the vulnerabilities; and
stimulate industry to apply emerging technology to counter these vulnerabilities.
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A fundamental step in shoring up the technical weakness of today's computers is
defining a clear, well formulated policy to influence secure computer system designs.
The computer designer must be told exactly what policy the system must enforce. The
computer cannot make a judgment regarding the user's request for access to stored
information. It can only grant or deny access based on the authority that it has been
given. Thus, what is needed, as a basis for any trusted system, is a policy that
articulates well defined authorizations to information and computer resources.
There are many documents which attempt to define requirements for trusted
computer systems. They have been generated at all levels of the government, and in
some cases are in conflict with each other. In 1983 an attempt was made within the
Department of Defense (DOD) to consolidate these documents as well as other
information concerning trusted computer systems. The goal was to create a single
source document which would define guidelines for the development and testing of new
systems. The result was entitled "DOD Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria," commonly referred to as the 'Orange Book' [Ref. 3]. Published in 1983, it
contains definitions and information essential to understanding trusted computer
systems. The Orange Book goes into extensive detail concerning the implementation of
automated data processing (ADP) security systems. As described in the Orange Book
there is mandatory security which is defined as:
Security policies defined for svstems that are used to process classified or other
specifically categorized sensitive information must include provisions for the
enforceme'nt of mandatorv access control rules. That is, they must include a set
of rules for controlling access based directly on a comparison of the individual's
clearance or authorization for the information and the classification or sensitivitv
designation of the information being soueht, and indirectlv on considerations oT
physical and other environmental factors of control. The mandatorv access
control rules must accuratelv reflect the laws, regulations, and general" policies
from which they are derived. '[Ref. 3: p.72]
As the name implies, mandatory security policy is a strict limitation of access
based on access level, which is determined by the user's security clearance. This policy
can not be changed and represents the foundation for the second type of security
policy. Discretionary security policy is a subset of mandatory security policy which
represents a further restriction of access to information based on a user's "need to
know" the information. The control objective for discretionary security is:
Securitv policies that are defined for svstems that are used to process classified
or other sensitive information must include provisions for the enforcement of
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discretionary access rules. That is, they must include a consistent set of rules for
controlling and limiting access based on identified individuals who have been
determined to have a need-to-know for the information. [Ref. 3: p.73]
This type of security is a definite asset in a research and development
environment. For example, when developing combat system software, a project
manager may have teams developing several modules simultaneously on the same
system. Although the modules may be of the same classification level, the manager
may want to limit each team's access to the module on which they are working. This
would be accomplished by establishing a discretionary security policy.
Traditional attacks on security systems have involved compromise of keywords
which would allow unauthorized access to a system. This threat can largely be
eliminated by physical means: changing keywords, multi-level identification, and
restricting access to the system. A more subtle attack, and potentially more dangerous
threat is the establishment of a covert channel in the system. A covert channel is
defined as "any communications channel that can be exploited by a process to transfer
information in a manner that violates the system security policy." [Ref. 3: p. 79] In a
multi-level computer system, the presence of a covert channel can be exploited to gain
unauthorized access to information without alerting security mechanisms. Covert
channels will be discussed further as a design consideration for a multi-level secure
communications system.
One of the most difficult tasks in developing trusted computer systems is
determining test criteria to evaluate their performance. As the security level is
increased, the test criteria become more stringent and detailed. When operating in a
network environment, the problem is compounded by requiring communications
security between the trusted computer systems as well.
Although such an explicit policy is necessary, it is not sufficient; the problem
remains the effectiveness of the operating system. One technology that can provide
penetration-proof controls is a security kernel. A security kernel is essentially a small
subset of an operating system and its associated hardware that will guarantee internal
enforcement of an explicit security policy, independent of the rest of the operating
system or user programs.
The security kernel is a breakthrough that has transformed the designer's game of
wits with penetrators into a methodical design process. Since early kernels were first
introduced in 1972, further research has demonstrated their feasibility, functionality
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and broad certifiability. With such technology available, vendors are now beginning to
offer kernel based operating systems. Its successful implementation will enable
computers to thwart subversion attacks aimed at unauthorized access, disclosure,
modification or disruption of service of a computer-based CI system. This entails not
only converting policy objectives into technical standards based on a mathematically
sound means to specify security requirements, but also the means to verify their design
and implementation and to maintain continuous control upon acceptance.
Computer development in the past decade has made considerable progress in
meeting multiple level security requirements. There have been several approaches to
these requirements. Security kernel technology has been more successful and is the
main basis for practical computer security products. For example, under Navy
sponsorship, Honeywell has developed the SCOMP (Secure Communications
Processor) using a security kernel. Under Air Force sponsorship, IBM/ ITT is about to
deliver the SACDIN (Strategic Air Command Digital Network) processor which also
uses a security kernel. Both the SCOMP and SACDIN secure processors use a single
minicomputer.
With increasing recognition of the security problems in both computer and
network systems and recent security policy developments in the Department of Defense
(DOD), it would be useful for a research effort to start at the Naval Postgraduate
-I
School for the support of DOD wide security requirements in CI developments.
A new distributed CI testbed is being developed using the Gemini trusted
multiple microcomputer base to support some of the CI related research topics at the
Naval Postgraduate School. There are three ways to address the security problems
that form the foundation for this research.
• For untrusted computers and/or networks which alreadv have been developed
and are in operation today, such as the MILNET, new multilevel secure guard
devices are potential candi'dates.
• For networks which are still being developed such as DDN, new trusted
interface units could be developed to support multilevel security requirements.
• For new svstems which have not been designed, new trusted computer svstem
technologies can be included in the svstem desien to support new multilevel
secure CjI systems satisfying the DOD"Computer"3ecurity Center's criteria.
This thesis investigates the use of a trusted computing base (TCB) to act as a
multilevel secure interface between the tactical data systems (TDS) of the Marine
Corps. This thesis proposes that the Marine Corps Tactical Intelligenge Management
System (TIMS) act as a multilevel, trusted, systems manager with the ability to
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communicate with untrusted systems operating at single levels of security such as the
Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) System, the Advanced Tactical Air Control Central
(ATACC), the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS), and the
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM). Therefore, TIMS would act as the primary
interface and the center of information for the Marine Corps tactical data systems.
B. MARINE CORPS TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS (TDS)
1. General
The automated systems discussed in this section are those currently existing or
projected to support the exchange of tactical information for the Marine Corps. Each
will be described below. More detailed descriptions may be found in current Marine
Corps documentation such as the U. S. Marine Command and Control Master Plan
(C MP) [Ref. 4] and systems requirements documents and specifications. The Marine
Corps tactical data systems are a conceptual association of command and control
systems to support tactical operations. It consists of functionally oriented, tactical and
training systems, using, where feasible, common equipment, operational procedures,
data bases, and design philosophy. These systems, where appropriate, will interoperate
through a common communication system as depicted in Figure 1.1
2. The Marine Tactical Command and Control (MTACC) Systems
In order to receive, process, store, display and forward the large quantities of
information that will be available on the modern battlefield in a useful and timely
manner, selective application of automation within operations centers is required to
support the command and control of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). A
semi-automated, hardened, secure, and transportable command and control system,
capable of interfacing with existing Marine communications systems, is required in
operations centers to provide real-time data input/ output, storage, display, retrieval
and processing support to the commander in the performance of his operations,
planning, and intelligence functions. The Marine Tactical Command and Control
System (MTACCS) is a conceptual association of command and control systems to
support tactical operations. It consists of six functionally oriented tactical and training
systems, using, where feasible, common equipment, operational procedures, data bases,
and design philosophy, and, where appropriate, interoperating through a common
communications system.
The six systems included in the MTACCS concept are:










Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) System
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM)
Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS)
Position Location Reporting System (PLRS)
Tactical Warfare Simulation Evaluation and Analysis System (TWSEAS)
The following paragraphs from the C provide an overview of how each
MTACC system contributes to the whole configuration. This will be accomplished by
presenting a summary description of their design objectives and by describing
functional boundaries or limits for these systems. '
a. Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS)
MIFASS performs the critical function of coordination and control of
supporting arms. This is accomplished by integrating, directing, and coordinating
artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, and air support. Real-time friendly position location
reporting such as that provided by PLRS and the TAOC is essential to the effective
operation of MIFASS so that its rapid response capabilities can be fully realized.
MIFASS consists of suites of modular microprocessing and display equipment and
software tailored to the functions performed at a given level of command. It is
characterized by the commonality of equipment with other MTACC systems, especially
TCO with which it may share much of its equipment at some echelons.
b. Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) System
As the title implies, TCO is the system which will provide the commander
his principal assistance in combat operations planning, monitoring, and coordinating.
TCO will provide commanders with the capability to accomplish the planning and
direction of combat operations. Modular microprocessing and display equipment,
tailored for the using command, will be provided to MAGTF commanders at all levels
from the Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) down to battalion and squadron. Digital
Communications Terminals (DCTs), capable of transmitting and receiving combat-
essential information to and from battalion and squadron level, will be provided below
these levels. This will permit, in addition to other functions, the transmission of
forward-echelon combat information via TCO channels for entry into the Marine Air-
Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS). TCO is expected to become one of the
principal means by which information is passed to MAGIS. Conversely, intelligence
and information produced by MAGIS will be provided to echelons below MAF via
TCO. Friendly position location information (PLI), such as that available from the
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Position Location Reporting System (PLRS), is essential for TCO system operations.
TCO will be used to support staff operations and intelligence functions at all echelons
of command. By receiving, via the Landing Force Integrated Communications System
(LFICS) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and displaying
selected data from MIFASS, MAGIS. PLRS, and TAOM, TCO will provide the focal
point at which the commander can obtain his operational information and disseminate
command decisions.
The TCO mission is to provide an accurate data input, storage, information
retrieval, and processing system for the real-time support of ground, aviation and
MAGTF operational functions and those intelligence functions below MAF level (not
supported by MAGIS/IAC) within operations centers.
c. Tactical Air Operations Module {TAOM)
The TAOM will provide the Tactical Air Commander (TAC) with the
means to monitor, coordinate, and control intercept aircraft and surface-to-air missile
systems, including Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) weapons, and to give enroute
traffic control assistance to aircraft within the MAGTF area of responsibility. It is a
modular system which can be tailored to meet the requirements of any size MAGTF
from a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) to a Marine Amphibious Unit (MALI). In
order to augment its organic radar coverage capabilities for effective execution of the
TAOM air defense mission, the TAOM system exchanges TADIL-B position location
information with the senior MIFASS-supported FASC.
d. Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System {MAGIS)
The primary function of MAGIS is the processing of information
concerning the enemy, weather, and terrain into timely, accurate, detailed, all-source
intelligence in support of the tactical commander. The AN/TYQ-19(V) IAC, is a
tactical intelligence processing facility which will serve as the heart of MAGIS. The
IAC will accept information from the Imagery Interpretation segment, Tactical
Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System, Integrated Signals
Intelligence System, MAF Reconnaissance and Surveillance Center, division and wing
intelligence centers, TCO, and other sources for processing into intelligence. Normally,
one IAC is assigned to each MAF and may be retained at the MAF headquarters or
assigned to the Air Combat Element (ACE), or the Ground Combat Element (GCE)
Headquarters. The automated intelligence functions will be supported by the Tactical
Intelligence Management System (TIMS). TIMS will handle intelligence information
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with a classification above secret and TCO will handle intelligence information with a
classification of secret or lower.
e. Position Location Repotting System (PLRS)
PLRS performs the function of position location reporting of PLRS-
equipped units, vehicles, and aircraft essential to TCO and MIFASS maneuver and
firepower coordination and control. Its capability of locating friendly units, vehicles,
and aircraft brings the element of real-time, accurate, current PLI to the battlefield
commander.
/. Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System ( TWSEAS)
Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System. TWSEAS is
a tactical command and control system, with multiple capabilities for supporting
virtually all types of tactical exercises conducted in the Marine Corps. TWSEAS is not
a combat system; its role is training support. TWSEAS is a mobile facility designed
and configured for sustained operations in the field with tactical units during training
exercises. TWSEAS can function as a control center for an exercise, or be used to
support staff exercises, such as map maneuvers, which are not necessarily conducted in
the field.
3. Marine Air Command and Control System
MACCS comprises those agencies that support the air commander in the
exercise of centralized coordination and supervision of air operations while
decentralizing control to subordinate agencies. The systems supporting MACCS
agencies are described in more detail below. Their general concept of employment is
discussed in the C^MP.
a. Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM)
TAOM is a transportable, modular, software intensive, automated element
of the aviation CL system. It provides the primary link between MTACCS and
MACCS. It is therefore listed as a subsystem for both. The TAOM is capable of
controlling and coordinating the employment of air defense weapons in support of any
size MAGTF.
b. Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (A TACC)
ATACC is a computer-supported facility which provides the TAC with the
resources needed for planning and directing the air battle. It is the senior Marine air
command and control agency from which the TAC exercises overall supervision,
coordination and general control of tactical air operations. Subordinate agencies from
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which the TAC exercises these functions include the TAOC, DASC, Marine air traffic
control squadrons, and terminal control action elements.
c. Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (MA TCALS)
MATCALS provides semi-automated and automated capabilities for
aircraft surveillance, identification, tracking, vectoring, track hand-over, and cross-
telling. This system provides automated tracking based on correlation of radar;
identification, friend or foe; and data-link replies. The system provides simultaneous
landing control. It may control up to six aircraft with a routinely sustained landing
rate of one aircraft per minute, and has the technical capability of increasing the rate
to two aircraft per minute.
d. Other MACC Systems
Other systems to be included in the Marine Air Command and Control
System include the Marine Remote Area Approach and Landing System (MRAALS),
Tactical Data Communications Central (AN/TYQ-3), Direct Air Support Central
(DASC), Hawk. Missile System, and a host of radar sets.
4. Other Tactical Data Systems
Other tactical data systems include:
• Battery Computer System (BCS), AN/GYK-29.
• Radar Set, Firefmder, AN/TPQ-36.
• Field Artillery Meterological Data System (FAMDS), AN/TMQ-31.
• Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE), AN/PAW-3.
Additional detail on each of the tactical data systems listed may be found in the C MP
[Ref. 4] and other reference materials associated with individual programs.
5. Interoperability
Exchange of information between agencies participating in a tactical
(amphibious) operation is critical to the success of the overall mission. Equipment in
operations centers will provide the facilities required to achieve necessary
interoperability of information exchange with tactical data systems and the systems of
other services to support commanders at all echelons. Data exchange standards will be
in accord with the provisions of the U. S. Marine Corps Technical Interface Design
Plan (TIDP) and Technical Interface Concept (TIC) [Ref. 5: p. 1-5]. The interface
standards for data exchange between Marine tactical data systems and other service
systems will be in accord with the provisions established by the Joint Interoperability
of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) plan.
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6. Interface Requirements
In describing interoperability between systems, the levels of interface are
categorized into three levels: manual, semi-automated, and automated. In Table 1
from [Ref. 6: p. 4-4], the level of interface is defined for both sides of each interface.
Where the same level of interface exists at the systems on both sides of the interface, a
single designator appears in the matrix at the intersection of the column and row for
the two systems. For example, at the intersection of the row opposite "TAOM" and
the column headed "ATACC", the letter "S" appears, indicating that each system has a
semi-automated interface with the other system. Where the levels of interface are not
the same on both sides of the interface, the letter in the upper side of the box at the
intersection indicates the level of interface of the system at the head of the column.
The level of interface for the system named on the left side of the row is indicated by
the letter in the lower half of the box.
Table 2 from the Technical Interface Concept for Marine Tactical Systems,
[Ref. 6: p. 4-6], depicts the general character of the interface. The communication
medium, requirements for controllers, and the use of TADILs are portrayed. The
actual physical interface in each case is provided by either or both of the following
means:
• Cable; e.g., fiber optic cable, 26-pair cable, and wire.
• Radio; e.g., single channel and multichannel.
An additional element of an interface may be an interface device or interface
controller. Such a device is necessary where the interoperating systems use
incompatible circuit and/ or message standards or operate at different levels of security.







Tactical Data Interface Links (TADIL) are used to achieve interoperability
between Marine Corps TDSs and other service systems, and among some Marine
Corps systems. A TADIL is a JCS-approved, standardized, communications link
suitable for transmission of digital data. TADILs are characterized by standard
22
TABLE I









































































MIFASS A A A S A M A s S
TCO A A s s M
DCT S S M M S s
AN/TYQ-1 s S M M M
ATACC S s s S S S s s
AN/TYQ-2 s s M M M M A A
TAOM A s s M M M S A A
AN/TSQ-122 M M M M
IDASC M M M M M M
RGDBS M M M M
MATCALS M S M M
HAWK BCC A
HAWK AFU A








TIMS M M M M M M M
TCAC S M S A
CCO A S




M: Manual S: Semi-automatic A Automate
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message formats and transmission characteristics. TADILs appearing in table 2 are
listed below:
TADIL A (NATO Link 11).
TADIL B.
TADIL C (NATO Link 4A).




The protection of tactical data systems is vital to landing force safety and
imposes stringent requirements for system security. The primary elements which
implement this protection are TDS equipment and program features, physical security
measures, procedural features, and access controls. These features provide the in-



















































































MIFASS 5 3 3 3 8 3 5 5 5
TCO 3 3 3 3 3
DCT 3 3 3 3 3 1
AN/TYQ-1 3 8 3 3 3
ATACC 8 3 8 8 3 8 3 8
AN/TYQ-2 8 3 3 3 3 3 13 13
TAOM 8 8 3 3 3 3 8 13 13
AN/TSQ-122 3 3 3 3
IDASC 3 3 3 3 3 3
RGDBS 3 3 3 3
MATCALS 3 8 3 3
HAWK BCC 13
HAWK AFU 13








TIMS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TCAC 3 3 3 3
CCO 3 3










Cable; e.g., fiber optic cable, 26-pair cable and wire
2. Radio, e.g., single channel and multichannel
3. Cable and radio
4. Cable with an interface controller
5. Cable and radio with interface controller
6. Radio with TADIL A
7. Radio with TADIL B
8. Cable and radio with TADIL B
9. Radio with TADIL C
10. Radio with TADIL B
1 1
.
Radio with TADILs A and J
12. Radio with TADILs C and J
13. Cable and radio with ATDL 1
14. Cable and radio with NATO Link 1
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II. BACKGROUND
A. MULTILEVEL SECURE COMPUTING SYSTEMS
1. Trusted Computer System Requirements
As computer systems have become more sophisticated and widespread in their
applications, the need to protect their integrity has grown. Protection is often thought
of as a supplement to multiprogramming operating systems, so that untrustworthy
users might share a common logical space, such as a directory, or a common physical
space such as memory. Modern security concepts have evolved to increase the
reliability of any complex system which makes use of shared resources.
In general, secure systems will control, through the use of specific security
features, access to information [Ref. 3: p. 3]. Protection refers to the mechanism for
controlling the access of programs, processes, or users to the resources defined by a
computer system. This mechanism must provide a means for specification of the
controls to be imposed, together with some means of enforcement. There are several
incentives for protection. Most obvious is the need to prevent mischievous, intentional
violation of an access restriction by a system user. Of equal importance is the need to
ensure that each program component active in a system uses the system resources only
in ways consistent with stated policies. This is an absolute requirement for a trusted
system.
A computer system may be viewed as a collection of processes and resources.
To ensure the orderly and efficient operation of a system, the processes are subjected
to policies that govern the use of resources. The role of protection in a computer
system is to provide a mechanism for the enforcement of the policies governing
resource use. These policies may be established in a number of ways. Some are fixed
in the design of a system, while others are formulated by the management of a system.
A protection system must have the flexibility to enforce a variety of policies that can
be declared to it.
Policies for resource use may vary, depending on their application, and they
may be subject to change over time. For these reasons, computer security can not be
considered solely as a matter of concern to operating system designers. It should be
available as a tool for the applications programmer, so that resources created and
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supported by an application may be guarded against misuse. There must be protection
mechanisms provided so that applications designers may use them in designing their
own protection software.
One important principle is the separation of policy from mechanism.
Mechanisms determine how to do something while policies determine what will be
done. This separation is very important for flexibility. Policies are likely to change
from time to time or place to place, whereas, mechanisms should be more general, only
requiring modification of certain parameters or minor change.
A computer system is a collection of processes (or subjects) and objects.
Objects may be hardware objects (such as the cpu, memory segments, printers, card
readers, or tape drives), and software objects (such as files, programs, and semaphores).
Each object has a unique label that differentiates it from all other objects in the system
and can be accessed only through well-defined and meaningful operations.
Obviously, a process should be allowed to access only those resources it has
been authorized to access. Furthermore, at any time it should be able to access only
those resources that it currently needs to complete its assigned task. This requirement
is commonly referred to as the need-to-know principle or discretionary access control.
This principle is useful in limiting the damage that a faulty process can cause a system.
These access controls shall be capable of specifying, for each named object, a list
of named individuals and a list of 2roups of named individuals with their
respective modes of access to that object. Furthermore, for each such named
object, it shall be possible to specify a list of named individuals and a list of
eroups of named individuals for which no access to the object is to be eiven.
[Ref. 3: p. 43]
This introduces the concept of a protection domain. A process operates
within a protection domain, which specifies the resources that the process may access.
Each domain defines a set of objects and the types of operations that may be invoked
on each object. The ability to execute an operation on an object is an access right. A
domain is a collection of access rights, each of which is an ordered pair < object-name,
rights-set > . For example, if domain A has the access right < file X, read,write> , then
a process executing in domain A can both read and write file X, it cannot perform any
other operation on that object.
A domain is an abstract concept which may be realized in a number of ways:
• A domain mav be defined for each user. The set of objects which can be
accessed depends on the identity of the user.
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• A process may be a domain. Each object which can be accessed by that
process is described. Also each operation which may be performed is defined.
• Each procedure may be a domain. Thus, each object which may be accessed by
that procedure is defined.
The degree of protection provided in existing computer systems has usually
been achieved through a security kernel, a guard which inspects and validates each
attempt to access a protected resource. Since extensive access validation is potentially
a source of considerable overhead, it must either be given hardware support to reduce
cost, or one must accept that the system may be designed with lower goals of
protection. It is difficult to satisfy all of the goals if the flexibility to implement
various security policies is restricted by the support mechanisms provided.
As operating systems have become more complex, and particularly as they
have attempted to provide higher-level user interfaces, the goals of protection have
become much more refined. In this refinement, we find that designers have drawn
heavily on ideas that originated in programming languages, especially on concepts such
as abstraction, layering, visualization, and information hiding. Protection systems are
now concerned not only with the identity of a resource to which access is attempted,
but also with the functional nature of the access.
Policies for resource use may also vary, depending on the application. For
these reasons, protection can not be considered solely as a matter of concern to system
designers, it must also be available as a tool for the applications designer in order that
applications may be guarded against tampering or the influence of an error.
There are two documents which provide the basis for evaluation of the
effectiveness of security controls built into computer systems or networks. These
documents are distributed by the National Computer Security Center located at Fort
Meade, Maryland. They are the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (CSC-STD-001-83) dated 15 August 1983 and the Department of
Defense Trusted Network Evaluation Criteria (draft) dated 29 July 1985. These two
documents form the foundation for all acceptable secure computer systems.
To call any computer system "secure," a set of requirements must be
established. There are six fundamental requirements presented in [Ref. 3] as the
absolute essentials for obtaining a secure system. Four of these requirements deal with
the means to be provided to control access and two deal with how one can obtain
credible assurances that this is accomplished in a trusted computer system.
• Requirement one -- SECURITY POLICY -- There must be an explicit and well
defined security policy enforced by the system. Given identified subjects and
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objects, there must be a set of rules that are used by the svstem to determine
whether a given subject can be permitted to gain access to a specified object.
• Requirement two -- MARKING - Access control labels must be associated
with objects. In order to control access to information stored in a computer,
according to rules of a mandatory securitv policy, it must be possible to mark
every object with a label that reliably identifies the object's sensitivity level,
and; or modes of access accorded those subjects who may potentially access the
object.
• Requirement three -- IDENTIFICATION -- Individual subjects must be
identified. Each access to information must be mediated based on who is
accessing the information and what classes of information they are authorized
to deal with.
• Requirement four - ACCOUNTABILITY -- Audit information must be
selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to
the responsible party. A trusted system must be able to record the occurrences
of security-relevant events in an audit log.
• Requirement five -- ASSURANCE -- The computer svstem must contain
hardware/software that can be independently evaluated to provide sufficient
assurance that the system enforces requirements one through four above.
• Requirement six -- CONTINUOUS PROTECTION -- The trusted mechanisms
that enforce these basic requirements must be continuouslv protected aeainst
tampering and. or unauthorized change. No computer system can be considered
trulv secure if the basic hardware and software mechanisms that enforce the
securitv policv are themselves subject to unauthorized modification or
subversion. [Kef. 3: pp. 3-4]
Derived from these six basic requirements are the criteria for evaluation of
trusted computing systems. The criteria are divided into four divisions, D: minimal
protection, C: discretionary protection, B: mandatory protection, and A: verified
protection, ordered in a hierarchical manner from lowest to highest. Each division
represents a major improvement in the overall confidence one can place in the system
for the protection of sensitive information. A rating for a system is based on thorough
testing of the security relevant portions of the system. The security relevant portion of
the system is spoken of as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Division D: Minimal protection has only one class and is reserved for systems
that have been evaluated, but failed to achieve the standards of a higher class.
Division C: Discretionary protection contains two classes that provide
discretionary access to information and the means to audit and account for such usage.
The two classes are: class CI: discretionary security protection and class C2: controlled
access protection. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of class CI satisfies
discretionary access requirements by separating users and data. The class CI
environment is expected to be one of cooperating users processing data at the same
level of sensitivity [Ref. 3: p. 12]. Identification and authentication are required to
determine authorized individual or group users. The discretionary control of class C2
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is made more rigid through login procedures, auditing of security relevant events, and
resource isolation. By limiting usage to specified individuals, accountability for
sensitive data is more easily maintained.
Division B: Mandatory Protection contains three classes that are characterized
by a Trusted Computer Base (TCB) that preserves the integrity of the security labels
and uses them to enforce a set of mandatory access control rules by using the reference
monitor concept. These three classes are: class Bl: labeled security protection, class
B2: structured protection, and class B3: security domains, class Bl systems have the
same requirements found in class C2 along with an informal statement of the security
policy model, data labeling and mandatory access control over named subjects and
objects [Ref. 3: p.20].
Class B2 requires the presence of a formal security policy unlike class Bl.
This formal policy must state both mandatory and discretionary access controls. The
TCB enforces a more rigid authentication mechanism. This is the first level that
addresses covert channels (channels which allow transfer of information in such a
manner that it violates the system's security policy). Systems which conform to class
B2 requirements are considered to be relatively resistant to penetration [Ref. 3: pp.
28-30].
Class B3 systems must include a reference monitor that mediates over all user
access to system information. They must be tamperproof and small enough for
exhaustive testing and analysis. The audit mechanisms in class B3 systems are
expanded to signal all security relevant events and recovery procedures [Ref. 3: pp.
33-40].
Division A: Verified Design contains one class, class Al which has the most
rigid security requirements given the state of current technology. Extensive
documentation is required on the TCB to demonstrate the ability to conform to
security requirements. Systems in this class are functionally equivalent to class B3.
The primary difference is the formality of class Al. There are no architectural or
policy differences. Formal security verification methods are required to assure that
both discretionary and mandatory access controls protect all classified or sensitive
information either stored or processed on the system.
2. The Security Kernel and Guard Technology
A security kernel is defined to be the hardware/software component that
implements the concept of a reference monitor [Ref. 7]. Since the early 1970's several
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efforts have been underway to build secure operating systems based upon the kernel
approach. The concept of a security kernel grew out of the concept of a reference
monitor-an abstract mechanism that controls the flow of information within a
computer system by mediating every attempt by a subject (active system element) to
access an object (information container) [Ref. 7]. The hardware/software mechanism
that implements the reference monitor is called a security kernel.
The basis of the security kernel idea is that a small central portion of an
operating system (both hardware and software) can be designed in such a way as to
control the rest of the system and in doing so, make sure that the system functions
according to some system of good behavior. To provide security, a kernel must:
• mediate every access by a subject to an object,
• be protected from unauthorized modification,
• and correctly perform its functions. [Ref. 7]
A kernel satisfies the first requirement by creating an environment within
which all non-kernel software is constrained to operate and by maintaining control
over it. The requirement to protect against unauthorized modification is satisfied by
isolating the security software in one or more protected domains. Finally, the
requirement that the kernel correctly performs its functions can be satisfied by using a
formal methodology. Such a methodology would include:
• proof that the kernel behavior enforces the desired policy, and
• proof that the kernel is correctly implemented with respect to the description of
its behavior used in the first step. [Ref. 8]
There are two classes of applications designed for security kernels: uni-level
and multi-level. Uni-level applications can be categorized as those that could be built
on conventional, nonsecure operating systems, but use a secure system to eliminate the
cost associated with operating several systems at different levels. Because uni-level
applications contain no sharing of information across security levels, they contain no
additional "trusted" code other than the security kernel and supporting software.
[Ref. 9]
The more interesting class of applications are those that are inherently multi-
level. Multi-level applications generally enforce a much richer policy than that
provided by the underlying security kernel. In order to build multi- level applications,
the concept of a "trusted process" was added to the security kernel. A trusted process
is a security relevant process that requires the ability to ignore one or more of the
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kernel supplied protection rules. In providing a trusted process with this capability,
one must demonstrate that this process does not circumvent the integrity of the kernel
and that the trusted process enforces the more complex policy for which it was
intended. The architecture of a multi-level application consists of one or more
untrusted application processes working together with the security kernel, as extended
by the application's specialized process [Ref. 8].
One specific application of the multi-level secure kernel is the "Guard
Application". In military operations, there is a great need to be able to interconnect
computers of different classification levels. Unfortunately, such connections are very
difficult to implement in a secure manner. This problem would be made much easier if
all computers had secure operating systems available, but such is not the case.
There is also a recurring need to make a subset of classified data available for
use at a lower level of classification. To prevent compromise, this is done through the
use of "sanitization" and "downgrading." Sanitization is often accomplished by
removing the identity of the source of the data or by reducing the precision of the data.
If the system that performs these functions is not multi-level secure, then we cannot
trust it to perform the sanitization and release function properly.
A guard application is an intermediate solution to this problem. A guard
consists of a secure computer that acts as an interface between systems at different
levels [Ref. 10]. Information may be transferred to systems at greater security levels
without intervention. Information transferred to systems at a lower security level must
be checked to ensure that no compromise occurrs. This check is normally made via
human review.
Security kernels were first justified as a basis for allowing users having
multiple clearances to share a common hardware. The emerging problem appears to
be the inability to communicate and process information effectively at multiple levels
without imposing unnecessary constraints on the users. Security kernels provide a
foundation for allowing multi-level secure computing.
One means of automatically checking the security level of information to be
transferred to a lower level is the use of a cryptographic checksum, a function of the
entire record, computed by a special authentication device as data is entered into a
system. The checksum is appended to the record and stays with the record forever. As
information enters the system, the guard computes a unique, non-forgeable checksum
which is appended to the entry before it enters the data base. When a record is
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selected for output, it is routed to a dedicated system (the guard processor) where the
cryptographic checksum is recomputed. If the recomputed value is identical to the
checksum appended to the record when it entered the data base, the entry can be
released without further review. If the checksum check fails, the item will not be
forwarded to the requester and the record, destination and all other pertinent
information will be written to an audit file and reviewed by a sanitization; special
security officer.
The cryptographic checksum of the original entry is produced using a secret
key known only to the guard interface processor. The checksum is produced by block-
chained encipherment of the incoming entry. In block-chained encipherment, the
ciphertext of each block of the item being enciphered is dependent on the contents of
all previous blocks. The last block of an item is dependent on the entire entry and is
used as the checksum. [Ref. 11: p. 15]
With the cryptographic checksum keys physically isolated from all
components but the guard interface, the only method of forging a checksum is to pick
a 64-bit number at random and attach it to a record. The probability of picking a
correct checksum is 1/2 (the size of the checksum) or 5.24 x 10" i' [Ref. 11: p. 15].
In summary, the protection against forgery is provided by protecting the key.
Key protection is provided by:
• Physically separating the guard interface and the message processor.
• Hard-wiring the key on the encryption board so that it is not even readable by
the guard.
• Providing a securitv kernel in the guard (input check-sum generator) to control
their operation. [Ref. 11: p. 17]
3. Data Encryption
Data encryption is fundamental to a secure communications network. The
methods available vary widely as do the security levels for which they are approved.
Approval is based on the computational power, and the amount of time required to
break the code. A cipher that cannot be proven to resist all attacks is considered
"computationally secure" if the computational cost involved in breaking it exceeds the
value of the information gained [Ref. 12]. Recent technological advances have
produced computer chips which reliably encrypt data with a high degree of security.
The relatively low cost and high speed of these devices make them excellent choices for
secure network applications. The major problem to date has been getting them
approved for transport of DOD classified data. Two major encryption methods are the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [Ref. 13], and the public key systems [Ref. 12]. The
Gemini system used in this research uses DES as its encryption method, and therefore
it will be the only method discussed.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is the National Bureau of Standards
(NBS) cryptographic protection standard [Ref. 14]. It is widely used for the protection
of commercial data. It has come under attack from several sources [Ref. 14: p. 171].
Because of these alleged weaknesses, DES is not currently authorized for transmission
of DOD classified data. Despite its problems DES remains a highly secure and reliable
method of encryption for official documentation which would otherwise be transmitted
in unencrypted form. The remainder of this section will discuss characteristics of DES
encryption and techniques which can be used to maximize the protection of
transmitted data.
There are four modes in which the DES may operate. They are: the
Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, the
Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, and the Output Feedback (OFB) mode [Ref. 15].
a. Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode
Figure 2.1 shows how a DES device operates in this mode. ECB is the
simplest of the DES modes, however, it is also the most vulnerable to attack. This is
because identical blocks of cleartext code will always produce identical ciphertexts until
the encryption key is changed. This method is not recommended for transmitting
messages which contain repetition of data forms such as English text messages
[Ref. 14: p. 178]. Since identical blocks yield identical ciphertexts, by observing over a
period of time an intruder would eventually be able to determine the cleartext message.
b. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
Figure 2.2 shows how the CBC mode operates. CBC is a block encryption
method which overcomes the pattern recognition problems of ECB mode by using the
ciphertext of each preceding block as an input to encrypt the next block. The process
is started by applying an initialization vector to the first block of data to be encrypted.
Incompleted blocks are padded as additional protection against pattern recognition
attacks.
c. Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode
Figure 2.3 shows the CFB mode of operation. CFB mode is a stream
encryption technique in which a key stream is generated, then combined with plain text




Figure 2.1 ECB Mode of DES Encryption.
generation process. Stream ciphers are in general slower than block ciphers [Ref. 16: p.
151], and are not used when large throughputs are required.
d. Output Feedback (OFB) Mode
The OFB mode is also a stream encryption method. In this method the
key stream is completely independent of the plaintext and ciphertext streams. This
eliminates the problem of error propagation and would seem to be a definite
advantage. However, some degree of error propagation is required to detect message
modification attacks [Ref. 16: p. 149]. As a result, OFB mode is not normally used in
secure network environments. This mode is not implemented on the Gemini system's
hardware encryption device because it is not self synchronizing.
The interface being developed in this thesis can best be implemented using
the CBC mode of DES encryption. The system must be capable of quickly handling
large volumes of data (large throughput), as well as official correspondence.
4. Summary
Assuming that the guard system works as described and it is interposed
between TCO and other Tactical Data Systems, this approach has several interesting
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Figure 2.2 CBC Mode of DES Encryption.
properties with respect to multilevel security. First, no failure or compromise of
hardware or programs in the TCO will permit data to spill from TCO to any other
system. Second, no manipulation of TCO or its processor will release information
across the guard interface. This is because the guard interface will be designed to only
deal with TCO messages, and to escape the guard, a cryptographic checksum is






















Figure 2.3 CFB Mode of DES Encryption.
the checksum computed when the message entered TCO, the message does not get
released.
The guard can be designed in such a way as to permit TCO to test the correct
operation of the guard by addressing various kinds of messages to itself. The only
records that should return are those whose checksum is properly computed and
recomputed. If there is a concern that an attacker could use this facility to generate
and test checksums, it might be noted that it would take about 5S.494 years to
systematically try all possible 2 checksums against a single record. At the rate of
10,000,000 trials/second on average, one could expect to find the correct checksum in
one half the time, or 29,247 years [Ref. 11: p. 19].
B. GEMINI TRUSTED MULTIPLE MICROCOMPUTER BASE
1. Description of Gemini System Components
The Gemini Trusted Microcomputer Base is one of the systems currently
being evaluated by the National Computer Security Center for certification at the B3
[Ref. 3] level of classification. Until recently, lack of evaluation criteria, as well as,
microprocessor technology, made construction of such systems impractical. The
foundation upon which all trusted computer systems are developed- is the security
kernel. The Gemini system employs the latest technology in both hardware and
software engineering. Some of its major features are:
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• The capability to operate up to eieht Intel iAPX-286 microcomputers in
parallel. This provides tremendous processing power, while communicating
through shared memory increases throughput.
• The Gemini svstem is extremelv flexible with regard to the tvpes of peripheral
devices which may be connected to the Multibus. These include fixed hard disk,
removable disk, and high densitv floppv diskette drives, as well as, non-volatile
memory devices. A maximum o'f eight devices may be attached to each RS-232
I/O interface board.
• With its multiple microcomputers, the Gemini system supports a varietv of
multiprocessing and multiprogramming applications. Processes can be pipelined
to a single processor, or distributed in parallel among several processors.
• Other features include a NBS DES chip encrvption device, real-time clock, and
non-volatile memory to protect passwords and encryption keys. [Ref. 17]
The Gemini system also provides a self-hosting environment for software
development [Ref. 17: p. 4]. This allows users to develop applications software.
Gemini supports several advanced programming languages for development. These
include JANUS/ADA, PASCAL, and C. Because of the secure environment, not all
standard constructs are supported, especially in the input/ output area. Because
communications to and from devices require special formats, utility libraries are
provided with the system containing routines which put calling arguments in the proper
format for use in GEM SOS.
A major attraction for the Gemini system is its tremendous potential for
growth. Its ability to handle a variety of hardware configurations is especially valuable
in DOD applications where a trusted computer system may be required to
communicate with systems using different protocols and hardware interfaces. When
used as proposed in this thesis as a guard between two untrusted systems, the Gemini
system could potentially communicate with a variety of communications devices using
different I/O ports.
2. Gemini Resource Management Overview
The Gemini Secure Operating System (GEM SOS) kernel is logically divided
into three management areas. These are: segment management, process management,
and device management. Management functions are invoked by initiating a GEM SOS
service call [Ref. 17: p. 5]. The formats for calling arguments are found in the
GEMSOS interface libraries provided with Gemini's software development tools.
a. Segment Management
All data used in the GEMSOS environment is contained in segments. The
applications programmer is mainly concerned with code segments, stack segments, and
data segments. Bootstrap and kernel segments normally do not change when
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developing basic applications software. There are eight segment management
functions. A discussion of how to initiate these service calls is contained in
[Ref. 20: pp. 16-28]. Segments can also be managed in groups. Secondary storage
devices are represented by volumes which can be identified as separate entities to a
calling process. Volumes and individual segments can be brought into the address
space of the calling process by using resource management service calls.
b. Process Management
Through process management functions the Gemini system is able to
support a full range of multiprogramming and multiprocessing applications. Each
process is uniquely identified by code, stack, and data segments. Once created the
process can be synchronized to run simultaneously with other processes using one of
two methods. Eventcounts and sequencers were selected over other techniques because
they are particularly well suited to operation in a secure environment [Ref. 17: p. 6].
All segments created in an applications program are assigned an eventcount and
sequencer automatically. Process management calls to these devices allow the
programmer to coordinate process functioning while maintaining access security.
c. Device Management
The third management area is device management. The Gemini approach
to device management is to minimize the size of the security kernel code by reassigning
device management functions to application level code whenever possible [Ref. 17: p.
9]. This has two effects. Reducing the size of the kernel makes verification easier,
however it also makes writing applications software more difficult. Traditional input
and output files are replaced by segments which can be read from or written into.
Devices are attached and detached to allow them to be used by more than one calling
process. Process synchronization primitives are used to control access to the segments
made available to an attached device. The I/O device controller is treated as a process,
which is then synchronized with the available segment eventcounts or sequencers to
perform the required device management functions. Additional information concerning
Gemini resource management functions is contained in [Ref. 17: pp. 5-10].
3. Gemini Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) Architecture
The Gemini system uses four hierarchical rings to implement its security
structure. Ring provides the most security, while ring 3 is least secure. It can
support both discretionary and mandatory policies. The mandatory policy is contained
in ring 0. This policy cannot be modified. Ring 1 is used to control the discretionary
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or 'need-to-know' policy, supervise the use of the data encryption device, and support
other security functions not contained in the mandatory policy. Ring 2 and 3 are
available to the programmer for use in developing applications software. The security
mechanism which coordinates inter-ring communications involves the control of access
to subjects and objects. A subject is a process which is allowed to operate over a
specific domain within the system. An object is a specific piece of information which is
assigned a security label. All access between subjects and objects is controlled by the
GEMSOS security kernel located in ring 0. Approval is based on comparison of the
security labels of the two entities trying to gain access.
Compromise Properties:
1) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the compromise
access component of the subject must dominate the compromise
access component of the object.
2) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the compromise
access component of the object must dominate the compromise
access component of the subject.
Integrity Properties:
1) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, then the integrity
access component of the subject dominates the integrity access
component of the object.
2) If the subject has "observe" access to an object, then the integrity
access component of the object dominates the integrity access
component of the subject.
Figure 2.4 Compromise and Integrity Properties.
Security labels are used to identify the access class of all subjects and objects.
The access class is further broken into a compromise (observe) level and an integrity
(modify) level. Compromise and integrity protection are based on strict properties
which must be observed in order for access to be granted. Figure 2.4 is taken from
[Ref. 17: pp. 16,17], and contains a simplified statement of these properties.
Domination as stated in these properties means that the level of the access component
is greater than or equal to the entity it is trying to observe or modify.
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Compromise protection property 1 is a traditional security policy. It states
that in order to observe information, you must have a clearance equal to or greater
than the information you want to observe. The second property is more subtle. This
property prevents, for example, a secret user from modifying a file which could be
viewed by a confidential user. This property is especially important in prevention of
Trojan horse' type attacks [Ref. 18: pp. 65-69]. The integrity protection properties are
similar to the compromise properties except that they refer to the ability to modify
information. Property 1 states that in order to modify a confidential document, you
must have at least a confidential integrity level. The second integrity property
prevents, for example, a secret user from observing (and possibly being influenced by)
information which could be modified by someone at a lower integrity level.
In addition to the access class integrity described above, the Gemini system
also employs ring integrity. Ring integrity means that subjects at a certain level can
only access objects of the same, or higher ring number. This policy reinforces the
hierarchical structure of the GEMSOS rings.
These compromise and integrity policies are further complicated by the fact
that the Gemini system is a multilevel system. This means that both users and
resources may have clearance to access a range of security levels. Multilevel subjects
are potentially very dangerous because within their range of operation they are not
subject to the second compromise and integrity protection properties [Ref. 17: p. 20].
It is up to the applications programmer to ensure that he does not create subjects
which will allow violation of these properties. This is especially important when
interfacing with devices. Figure 2.5 is taken from [Ref. 17: pp. 21,22], and represents a
summary of the security properties of single and multilevel devices.
Device access levels refer to the physical security of the environment in which
the device is going to operate. This is separate from the security level of the process
which is attempting to communicate with the device. For example, a terminal located
in an unsecure room with an unclassified device access level, cannot receive
information from a secret process. The term single level device implies that the
maximum and minimum access classes for the device are the same. In multilevel




1) To receive ("read") information:
process maximum compromise > = device minimum compromise
device maximum integrity > = process minimum integrity
2) To send ("write") information:
device maximum compromise > = process minimum compromise
process minimum integrity > = device minimum integrity
Multilevel Devices:
1) To receive ("read") information:
process maximum compromise > = device maximum compromise
device minimum integrity > = process minimum integrity
2) To send ("write") information:
device minimum compromise > = process minimum compromise
process maximum integrity > = device maximum integrity
Figure 2.5 Single and Multilevel Device Properties.
4. Application Development Environment
a. General Description
This section provides the foundation for the necessary steps to develop
software for the Gemini system. It is important because it provides the basic
components that are needed for applications development. This provides a bridge
between the applications programmer and the operating system primitives to allow
development of reliable software.
The objective of this section is to present an ordered method of developing
application software within the GEM SOS environment. It should be considered as a
guide and not as a fixed set of rules. The facts considered here are taken from
[Ref. 20].
b. Hierarchical Storage Structure
The Gemini system provides a one-level secondary storage system for
information. File concepts are not supported by Gemini. Instead, segments are used
which are considered as objects having logical attributes related to them (i.e., security).
Each segment has a maximum size of 64 K bytes. The segments are handled by the
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system as a hierarchy, where each segment is identified by a unique path name
corresponding to the index of an entry in the Location Description Table (LDT) of the
process that creates and/ or uses that segment.
The representation of segments follow a hierarchical structure in which the
root is the system root (transparent to the user) and the whole collection of segments is
assembled as an inverted tree. Each application program becomes part of the
hierarchical structure and is statically created at system generation time using a system
submit file as explained in [Ref. 19].
System generation consists of creating a hierarchical structure of all
segments known to the system at system runtime. It is basically the inclusion of the
segment hierarchy of the application program into the GEMSOS hierarchy. This is
accomplished by using segments declared in the submit file. Figure 2.6 shows a typical
hierarchical structure representing the segments that GEMSOS requires to run
applications. This structure is fixed and must be considered in the development of any
application program. Figure 2.7 shows the addition of segments necessary to execute a
specific application. Entry 5 in the hierarchical structure is always dedicated as the
mentor (or root) of user applications. This entry is the mentor of all the segments that
are needed to implement the upper levels of the system application program. Under
the Gemini concept, a segment can support up to 12 descendents numbered from to
11. To support this concept there is a volume aliasing table (VAT) or volume mentor
that relates the segments to their mentors [Ref. 19: p. 2].
When a segment is used by a process, it must be deleted before it can be
made available for another process. The numbers indicated in both Figures 2.6 and 2.7
correspond to entry numbers of segments associated with a mentor (from to 11);
segment numbers have a different enumeration which corresponds to their entries in
the LDT. Each segment in the system has a unique path name that identifies it, but
not by the application process. Instead, a process-local segment number is used.
When two processes share the same segment, each one recognizes the segment by a
different segment number assigned in its own LDT.
For example, in Figure 2.7 the path 5,7 corresponds to a segment that
holds the code for a child application program and must be declared in the submit file.
Entry 5 is the mentor for entry 7. This creation is static and the path indicated must
be known in the application program. On the other hand, the path 5,5,7 is used to
hold data and will be created dynamically during execution of the application program.








J ( 3 J Q (?)••• [11 J
SSAT V1 LOADER 7\ V1 LOADER R1TRAP /NV.DS
CODE J \ STACK CODE /(APPLICATION/ MENTOR)





Figure 2.6 GEMSOS Hierarchical Structure.
c. I/O Device Assignment
The process of attaching devices must be accomplished before an I.O
device becomes known to the system. This involves assigning a logical process to the
I/O device so that the device is known by the process. The process then contains the
device drivers to allow it to manipulate the device. A device may be declared as either
a read (input) or write (output) device, as part of the information provided to the
"ATTACH" primitive call in GEMSOS [Ref. 20: pp. 43-44]. A device may be attached
to only one process at a time. An error will occur if an attempt is made to attach a
device by more than one process. The inverse primitive is called "DETACH" device.
This primitive detaches the associated process and the device becomes available for
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Figure 2.7 GEMSOS Hierarchical Structure Including an Application.
d. Process Creation
This section describes the steps that should be considered when creating a
process. One process is created from another. The creator is known as the "parent"
and the created process is known as the "child". The child process receives its
resources from the parent. Each process is a collection of segments known to that
process and managed using primitive functions or "calls" provided by the system. An
address space is created to hold a segment and an application programmer must make
use of GEMSOS primitives for the creation and use of address spaces.
The sequence of steps that must be followed in order to create a process
starts with the "CREATE" primitive. When this primitive is called an -address space is
created for that segment. The next step links the address space with a specific process,
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i.e., a recognition of the segment by the process as an entry in its Local Description
Table (LDT). The result is the identification of this address space with a segment
number. The primitive used for this is the "MAKEKNOWN" primitive.
The last step is related to the use of this segment—a segment must be in
main memory in order to be used. This function is performed using the primitive
"SWAP-IN", which loads the segment from secondary storage into main memory.
When the segment is no longer needed by the process., an inverse action
must be performed in order to release the space used by the segment. As in the
procedure described above, a logical sequence of steps must be followed, starting with
the release of the memory used by the segment. This is performed by the "SWAP-
OUT" primitive in which the segment is written back out to secondary storage. The
next step is the elimination of the association of the segment and the process.
Elimination of a segment from a process' address space is performed by the
"TERMINATE" primitive, which breaks the association and makes the entry number
used in the LDT of the process.
The final step is total removal of the segment from the system address
space. This is accomplished by the "DELETE" primitive. The result is the removal of
the segment from the system and the return of the address space to system resources.
e. Process Management
Because a process is a collection of segments, segment creation is an
important step that should be considered during process creation. Each segment has
its own attributes which are specified in a segment structure record and then declared
in a "CREATE_SEGMENT" primitive. The segment is created with the specified
attributes and the addition of a new branch in the hierarchical structure is made
[Ref. 20: pp. 20-21]. The inverse action is the "DELETE_SEGMENT" call, where a
segment previously created is now removed from the hierarchical structure [Ref. 20: p.
22]. This call is used when a process finishes its execution because segments are not
automatically removed.
/. Makeknownj Terminate Segment
The "MAKEKNOWN_SEGMENT" call adds the specified segment to the
address space of the calling process [Ref. 20: pp. 23-25]. Like all of the primitives it
has its own record structure, which must be initialized with the pathname that the
segments will use in the hierarchical structure. The inverse call.
"TERMINATE_SEGMENT" eliminates the pathname from the hierarchical structure
and frees the segment number from the LDT table [Ref. 20: p. 26].
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g. SwapinjSwapout Segment
A segment is created in secondary storage by first using the primitive
"SWAPIN_SEGMENT," to provide main memory space for the new segment.
"SWAPOUT_SEGMENT" is used to write a segment from main memory to secondary
storage. [Ref. 20: pp. 27-28]
h. Synchronization
Synchronization among processes is maintained by the use of eventcounts
and sequencers [Ref. 21: pp 115-124]. Segments used to control synchronization must
be common to all of the processes involved in that synchronization. An eventcount is
maintained by an integer counter under control of the cooperating process.
Completion of an operation (event) is signaled by incrementing the eventcount. The
updated eventcount provides a signal to a waiting process that the operation is
complete. The primitives used are described in [Ref. 20: pp. 37-41].
5. Summary
The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base is an extremely capable
computer system which combines state-of-the-art technology with a high degree of
flexibility to handle a variety of possible applications. Its multiple processor and
multiprogramming configurations are valuable assets when functioning as a secure
guard interface between two untrusted systems as proposed by this thesis. Its ability to
simultaneously handle devices with different protocol requirements and security levels
could potentially eliminate the need for time consuming review and sanitation of
information for transfer between Tactical Data Systems.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTILEVEL SECURE INTERFACE
A. GENERAL
1. Objectives
The objective of this research is to develop a simple interface which will
demonstrate how the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base may be effectively
used as a trusted computing base (TCB) linking untrusted command and control
systems. There are four major phases in the development of the system:
1) Demonstrate the transportabilitv of the JINTACCS Automated Message
Processing System (JAM PS) software to the Gemini Multiprocessing Secure
Operating System (GEMSOS).
2) Demonstrate the inter-seement linkage for the use of multiple language
applications programs andlibraries for use with GEMSOS.
3) Establish two way communications between users at remote terminals using
the Gemini system as a secure communications interface.
4) Demonstrate the use of Gemini security mechanisms to prevent unauthorized
access to sensitive information.
The Air Force JINTACCS Program Office in Langley, Virginia and MITRE
Corporation are currently working jointly to develop an automated, JINTACCS
format, message preparation system. This system is the Joint Interoperability of
Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) Automated Message
Preparation System (JAMPS). JINTACCS was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) so that the military services could have a common standard for communicating
during joint operations. JAMPS is a software package developed to automate the
preparation of these JINTACCS-standardized messages. The first phase of this
research is to demonstrate the transportability of the JAMPS software to the Gemini
Multilevel Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) in order to have JAMPS operate in a
multilevel secure environment allowing automation of JINTACCS message preparation
for communication between systems.
The Gemini system provides a self-hosting environment for software
development and provides development environments in several languages to include
PASCAL, C, and ADA. The second phase of this thesis is to develop applications
using more than one programming language to display the intersegment linkage of the
multi-language gates provided with GEMSOS and the flexibility of the Gemini
application development environment. The intention is to demonstrate the use of
49
ADA in a secure environment and to show the capability that GEMSOS has for
linking multiple languages. The languages used are PASCAL MT+86 and Janus
ADA. The Janus ADA environment has not been completely developed for use with
GEMSOS and a secure environment, specifically not all ADA constructs are supported
in the GEMSOS environment. The majority of the modifications occur in the
input; output area. Because communications to and from devices require special
formats in a secure environment, Gemini provides utility libraries which put these calls
in the proper format. Currently, these utility libraries are well developed for the
PASCAL language. The goal of the second phase of this research is to demonstrate
the flexibility of GEMSOS by writing segments of code in PASCAL and ADA using
inter-segment linkage to have the system manager, a trusted process written in
PASCAL, call and control multiple TDS terminal utility processes, written in both
PASCAL and ADA while maintaining the rules of compromise and integrity required
in the GEM SOS secure environment.
In order to create a realistic communications link, it is necessary to simulate
having untrusted computer systems communicating with each other. This is
accomplished by having the Gemini system communicate with itself using separate I/O
ports. By routing the incoming and outgoing traffic from each port to separate
processes, the "multiple computer" environment may be simulated. The interface is
controlled by the multilevel security manager located at a data terminal linked to the
Gemini system. This security manager is responsible for:
• System start-up and initialization.
• Assigning access levels for other terminals.
• Entering the cryptographic key.
• Control of communications to and from the external ports.
• Routing of message traffic to the appropriate terminals.
Each user terminal is assumed to be located in an area which would provide
appropriate physical security for the access level of the terminal. Each may enter
messages, transmit messages, and display incoming messages provided the terminal at
which they are located has the proper access level.
The final goal, to test security of information and access, is demonstrated
using a series of specific configurations and data sets to exercise security mechanisms.
These tests are meant to demonstrate, rather than prove that information security and
integrity are preserved. They are in no way intended to be exhaustive, however, they
allow for a series of observations to be made concerning overall system security.
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2. Design Constraints
The Gemini system used for the development of this demonstration has 12
ports available for attachment of I/O devices. This allows for up to eight user
terminals and the security manager terminal. For this demonstration, only the system
manager terminal and two TDS utility terminals are used for simplicity of design and
testing.
Software constraints are generated by the environment in which this type of
system would be used. An assumption is made that when acting as a multilevel trusted
computing base and interface device, the system will most likely be adapted to "off-the-
shelf" systems within the Department of Defense (DOD). Systems such as this have
built-in physical and software security attributes. For this reason, no effort is made to
provide security between the Gemini system and the remote terminals other than end-
to-end encryption. This security would be provided by some mechanism other than the
Trusted Computing Base (TCB). The lines are assumed to be secure, as are the
locations in which the terminals are used. In order to provide overall system security,
these security measures would have to be verified prior to installation of the trusted
computer system at a particular activity. Another assumption is that the system
demonstrated may communicate by a variety of means including hard wiring, secure
teletype, Autodin, DDN, or satellite communications. For this reason, no specific
protocol was adapted. JINTACCS message processing was used as the message
format, adapted to the Gemini system. Header information and secure labels were
placed on each message in order to allow transmission over a variety of
communications devices.
3. Summary of Design Decisions
Figure 3.1 shows a block diagram of the proposed system design. For
simplicity of the demonstration, only three terminals are used. One terminal is used as
the multilevel system manager and the other two simulate untrusted tactical data
systems such as MAGIS/IAC or ATACC. To provide additional flexibility, the. access
class of the untrusted terminal may be changed by the system security manager. The
untrusted terminal may send and receive messages from the trusted computer system,
however they must rely on the system security manager to actually transmit the
messages and provide the appropriate security.
It is necessary for the system security manager to create a single level process
for each user terminal attached. Figure 3.1 shows how a single level process is used to
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Figure 3.1 Proposed System Design.
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provide a buffer to protect information. Even if an attacker were to cause information
of a higher level to be misrouted by the multilevel process, it would still be protected
from compromise by the single level process which interfaces directly with the user
terminal.
In order for this design to work there must be synchronization among the
processes. Interprocess communications are synchronized by using eventcounts
[Ref. 22: p. 20]. Although the system simulates the link of two separate systems, only
one multilevel communications process is used to simplify the synchronization
problem. Since the communications processes would be identical this limitation does
not adversely impact system design.
B. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
1. Hardware Components
As discussed in the preceding section, the number of data terminals used in the system
was limited for simplicity of design and testing. Figure 3.2 shows the final system
hardware design. Terminal 100 is used by the system security manager to initiate and
coordinate communications via the external communications interface. Remote user
terminals are connected as read/write devices and attached to global serial ports and
3 of the Gemini computer. This represents untrusted users exchanging information via
the trusted process. The external communications interface is simulated with the use of
a null modem allowing the Gemini computer to communicate with itself. Global serial
ports 1 and 2 were used for this purpose. A user's guide for this demonstration is
provided in Appendix C.
2. Application Program Format
Preparing programs to run in the Gemini Multilevel Secure Operating System
(GEMSOS) environment is more complicated than running PASCAL programs in a
nonsecure environment. In order to be accepted by the system they must first be put
into a specific format which can be recognized by GEMSOS in order to gain access to
the security kernel. There are several software tools which can speed up the process of
preparing a program to be run in the secure environment. The fact that a program
compiles successfully does not necessarily mean that it will run in the GEMSOS
environment. For a PASCAL program, following compilation, the program is linked
to the appropriate modules using a file named, 'applicationname.KMD' [Ref. 23].
This file contains a formatted list of the modules with which the application segment
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Figure 3.2 Final Hardware Diagram.
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needs to be linked. The result of the linking process is a file named
'application_name.CMD' which still has no security classification assigned. To assign
security classification, and prepare the program to execute in the secure environment, a
secure volume must be created by running the operating system generation (SYSGEN)
program.
When developing a Janus;ADA application which is to run on GEM SOS, 3
main points must be kept in mind:
• Standard Janus/ADA I/O file type utilities cannot be used, GEMSOS kernel
calls must be made instead.
• The first statement in an application program must be a function call to the
"get rl_def function. This function returns the ring 1 process definition record
which is required for subsequent kernel calls.
• All applications must be linked with the "/c80" option, for example "JLINK
TDSI7C8O."
To assign security classification, and prepare the program to execute in the secure
environment, a secure volume must be created in the same manner as mentioned above
using the SYSGEN program.
Executing the SYSGEN program includes the application program in a
segment structure which is then transformed into a "bootable system structure on
formatted volumes." [Ref. 19: p. 1] Detailed procedures for using the SYSGEN
program are contained in [Ref. 19: p. 7-20]. The key to proper use of the SYSGEN
program is identifying the segment structure in which the application segment will be
placed. The segment structure includes the boot-strap, kernel, application code, and
data segments. The easiest way to identify this segment structure is to include it in a
submit file named 'application_name.SSB.' For basic application programs, the
segment structure does not change. Use of the submit (.SSB) file eliminates the need
to enter the segment structure interactively each time the operating system generation
program is run. Use of the SYSGEN submit mode is further explained in [Ref. 19: p.
9-14]. The submit file used for system generation of this demonstration (GUARD.SSB)
is provided in Appendix M.
C. SYSTEM SOFTWARE DESIGN
1. Application Segment Development
Application software for this system was developed using modular
programming construction techniques. This allowed for independent testing of each
module prior to its inclusion in the main program. This technique was especially useful
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because trouble-shooting GEM SOS related Ring service calls can be difficult for new-
users. Processes were developed as application code segments. They are:
1) multilevel system manager process (PASCAL MT+ 86)
2) single level terminal utility process (PASCAL MT + 86)
3) single level terminal utility process (Janus ADA)
Each process was developed as an independent application code segment. The
single level terminal utility segment may be assigned different access levels by the
system manager to demonstrate the interface to more than one system.
a. System Manager Segment
The system manager segment controls system configuration, data
encryption, and communications through the external communications ports. Figure
3.3 shows a flow diagram of how this segment is constructed. A detailed source listing
of the code implementation is contained in Appendix D.
Creation of a child process requires completion of four record structures.
Each record structure has several entries. Each entry is completed in a specific order
which builds to the 'CREATE_PROCESS' resource management call. Detailed
instructions for process creation and record entry format are found in [Ref. 20].
Segment and process management are the most difficult concepts for someone
unfamiliar with secure computer systems to grasp. The procedure developed in this
segment could be used as a model for process creation in other programs. The specific
entries may vary, however, the physical structure of the procedure is general enough to
fit a variety of applications.
The system security manager located at terminal has direct control over
system assets. To provide this control, the system manager has the option of
specifying (within predefined limits) how the system will operate. These parameters are
entered when the system is initialized. They are interactively entered into a system
operator record from which they can be drawn when required by other procedures.
Parameters which do not need to be directly controlled by the system manager are
fixed and cannot be directly accessed.
b. Terminal Utility Segments
As discussed earlier in this chapter the user terminals can input, transmit,
and display messages. Each terminal is a single level device capable of sending and
receiving messages of the same level. Figure 3.4 shows a flow diagram for the terminal
































Figure 3.3 System Manager Flow Chart.
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flow diagram is contained in Appendices H through L. This program is activated when
the terminal process is created by the system manager process.
All messages sent and received at the terminal are stored in a specially
designated message buffer segment. Access to this segment is shared by the user
terminal and the system manager process. Each terminal has its own message buffer
segment, and cannot access the other's segment without going through the system
manager process. When the user has completed his message transactions, he initiates a
logoff procedure. The logoff" procedure deletes the terminal process and returns the
resources allocated to the process to the system manager process which created it.
These include memory space, process local segment numbers, and any attached devices.
c. Program Documentation
Each module in the application segments has a header describing its
purpose, and general operation. The intent was to provide clear programs which could
be used as a basis for future research. In some cases this meant sacrificing efficiency
in order to provide better clarity.
2. Process Synchronization
Process synchronization was accomplished using the eventcount of the
message buffer segments of each terminal process created by the multilevel system
manager. By advancing the proper stack, eventcount the terminal process alerts the
system manager that it is ready to begin message processing. The terminal advances
the outgoing message buffer segment eventcount to notify the system manager process
when it desires to transmit a message or when it has completed processing. When a
terminal process indicates that it desires to transmit a message, the system manager
transmits the message, and then unblocks the other terminal process to display the
incoming message by advancing its incoming message buffer eventcount. This process
can be continued indefinitely. The actual implementation of this sequencing is further
explained in the applications code segment listings contained in Appendix D.
D. DESIGN SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the system design process in terms of its objectives
and limitations. The resulting hardware and software configuration was implemented











































Figure 3.4 Terminal Utility Flow Chart.
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The resulting system uses the Gemini as a secure communications interface and
message processing facility. All communications are protected to the maximum extent
possible using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm in the cipher block,
chaining (CBC) mode. Terminal processes are assigned single level access which
prevents a user from gaining unauthorized access to classified information by allowing
the kernel to enforce the rules of integrity (authorization to write) and compromise
(authorization to read).
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
A. SYSTEM OPERATION
The model communication system developed in this thesis to demonstrate using
the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base as a secure interface for data
communications met or exceeded all design goals. Messages were passed between
tactical data systems in a manner that ensured security from unauthorized access at
both source and destination. Data encryption was used to maximize the security of the
transmitted data. Finally, by varying the access class of the terminal processes it was
possible to demonstrate the system's ability to detect and respond to security
violations. Flexibility in determining system configuration allows modification of
system parameters to meet a variety of test requirements.
System operation is initiated and controlled by the system manager. The
multilevel system manager process creates the single level TDS processes at access
levels based on two separate controls. First, the Gemini computer used for testing and
evaluating the interface was configured to allow classification of the serial input/ output
ports. This means that the operating system, specifically the kernel, recognized the
maximum access level of each serial port. This process was completed by burning the
machine PROM specifying that each port had a maximum access level. The second
control measure was accomplished by allowing the multilevel system manager to
specify an access class at or below the maximum allowed by the serial port. Based on
these constraints, a TDS terminal may only display messages created at or below its
access level (enforcing the compromise level, authorization to read) and send messages
to other terminals at or above its access level (enforcing the integrity level,
authorization to write). It is important to note that, for this demonstration, the user
does not assign the classification of the outgoing message. Message classification is
assigned by the system manager according to the access level of the TDS sending the
message. All security checks are performed within the multilevel system manager
process to strictly enforce the security policy established for that system. To facilitate
security testing, the TDS access levels in this demonstration are manually entered by
the system manager. (If a local commander did not want to leave this choice up to the
system manager, the access level information could be hidden in a file that he does not
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have access to, or simply left as configured on the system PROM (built into the
hardware). Once started, the system operates independently. This eliminates the
possibility of a system manager manually misrouting information stored in the message
buffers.
One potential problem was the possibility that an unclassified user could enter
classified information in an unclassified message and transmit it to an accomplice who
had tapped into the external communications line. To help prevent this, the outgoing
message is encrypted using keys which are inserted by the system manager. Possible
compromise of the key could further be prevented by having the key entered by
someone other than the system manager or by a hardware key generation device. The
goal was to develop a process which would demonstrate the enforcement of basic
computer security measures and provide a baseline understanding of this technology
and its application in a tactical command and control system. There are a wide variety
of possible system configurations. Selection of a particular configuration would have
to be based on the security policy of the particular command and its associated
security requirements.
B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASES
1. JINTACCS Automated Message Preparation System Implementation
a. Discussion
JAMPS is a portable set of computer controlled equipment for assisting
operators in composing and exchanging JINTACCS messages. It provides one or
more operators a work station for composing communications messages over an
external link. Each work station provides the capability to store and retrieve messages
composed at the work station and messages received via external communications.
The original intent of this thesis was to completely integrate the JAMPS software into
a secure environment within and controlled by the Gemini Trusted Computer. After
close review it was determined that total integration of JAMPS was beyond the scope
of this thesis and further study is recommended in the area of transporting JAMPS into
the GEM SOS environment. JAMPS is used, however, in this thesis as a controlled
process by each of the TDS terminal utilities as the mechanism for creation of
messages used in the communication process.
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b. Compromise Design
The primary objective of this thesis remains the same, except that the
JAMPS software was not transported onto the Gemini computer. The JAMPS
procedure is, however, controlled by the TDS terminal utility process. Figure 4.1
depicts the hardware configuration showing a personal computer running the JAMPS
software attached to the Gemini computer as a write device of the same access class as
its controlling TDS. This actually creates a multi-terminal workstation with the PC
running the JAMPS software and transmitting JINTACCS formatted messages with
appropriate compromise and integrity rules enforced by the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB).
Each of the TDS workstations consists of a terminal and a personal
computer and may be configured with a printer for hard copies of transmitted and
received messages. Each element of the workstation would have the same access class
and therefore would be controlled by the system manager for enforcement of security.
It is recommended that a project be undertaken to transport the JAMPS
software onto the Gemini Trusted Computing Base to eliminate the need for the
additional PC and to have the message preparation process completely controlled by
the TCB rather than attaching it as an untrusted process.
2. Intersegment Linkage of Multiple Language Applications
The Gemini multiple microcomputer system is a self-hosting environment for
software development using the CP/M-86 operating system. Any programming
language that runs on CP/M-86 potentially can be used to develop concurrent
computing and multilevel secure application software. Gemini is currently supporting
the following languages: PASCAL MT + , Janus;ADA, PL/1, C, and FORTRAN.
Additional software development tools are provided by several utility programs
supplied as a part of the Gemini applications development package. Currently, the
PASCAL MT+ applications development environment is the most thoroughly
developed. This environment contains libraries of ring and ring 1 calls and routines.
The other languages have been supported for specific Gemini clients. An important
aspect of this thesis was a demonstration of the use of ADA in a secure environment,
therefore, the application development package provided by Gemini needed to be
updated and more completely developed to support this project. As a result, additional
libraries have been developed to support the ring and ring 1 calls for Janus/ADA to
bring applications support to a level comparable with PASCAL MT + . These libraries
are listed in Appendices I and J.
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Figure 4.1 Revised Hardware Configuration.
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All information in a Gemini system is contained in discrete, logical objects
called segments. Each segment has an access class that reflects the sensitivity of
information contained in the segment. Segments may be simultaneously shared by
multiple subjects, but access to the segment on the part of each subject is controlled by
the relationship between the segment's access class and each subject's access class.
Every segment in GEMSOS has a unique identifier. This identifier is
effectively different for every segment ever created in any Gemini system. Unique
identifiers are used to prevent "spoofing" of the system by substituting one segment for
another.
Different languages pass information and identifiers to segments in different
formats and using different protocols. Assembly routines can be used to "translate" the
information and protocols in order for subjects created in different languages to access
shared segments. This inter-segment linkage is necessary in the secure GEMSOS
environment for the kernel to enforce the security rules in the trusted environment.
The difficulty of inter-segment linkage can be reduced by creating separate
processes in different languages with their own code, stack, and data segments. By
creating separate processes, no assembly routines are required because, once the source
code is compiled, it is essentially identical and no protocol or translation is necessary.
The multi-language code segments can be called and implemented without restriction.
The final design included the system manager, a trusted process written in
PASCAL MT + , and untrusted TDS terminal utility processes written in PASCAL
MT+ and Janus ADA. Each TDS terminal utility was accessed and controlled by the
trusted process. Since each TDS utility process was separately compiled and linked,
there was no need for an assembly routine to translate information between segments.
Therefore, any language which can be compiled and linked into a CP/M-86
environment could be used to create untrusted processes.
3. Communications
In order to create a realistic communications link, it was necessary to simulate
having untrusted computer systems communicating with each other. This was
accomplished by having the Gemini system communicate with itself using separate I/O
ports. By routing the incoming and outgoing traffic from each port to separate
processes, the "multiple computer" environment could be simulated. The interface was
controlled by the multilevel security manager located at a data terminal linked to the
Gemini system. This security manager was responsible for:
• System start-up, initialization and testing.
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Assigning access levels for other terminals.
Entering the cryptographic key.
Control of communications to and from the external ports.
Routing of message traffic to the appropriate terminals.
Enforcing rules of integrity and compromise throughout the communications
network.
Each TDS terminal was allowed to input JAMPS formatted messages (using
the attached PC running the JAMPS software), transmit messages, and display
incoming messages provided the terminal at which they were located had the proper
access level.
A typical scenario might include:
System startup, login, and initialization.
Input of parameters such as communications ports, access class for each TDS
terminal, and buffer sizes.
Communications and encryption testing.
Creation of the child process for each TDS terminal.
Entering the transmit,' receive loop.
Message creation (activation ofJAMPS software)
Message transmission.
Message display
Enforcement of security rules and report of security violations.
Detaching and terminating child processes.
System shutdown.
Two way communications between TDS terminals could easily be maintained without
error, while ensuring that the rules of integrity and compromise were enforced.
a. System Upgrade
Initially, the Gemini computer installed in the Wargaming, Analysis, and
Research (WAR) laboratory was inadequate for development of a suitable
demonstration of the scope of this thesis. Initial development was done on site at
Gemini Computers in Monterey. During the development of the demonstration it was
determined that a system upgrade, to include memory expansion and a global serial
board (consisting of 8 serial ports) was necessary. A machine was configured at
Gemini and used until an upgrade could be accomplished on the Gemini computer in
the wargaming laboratory. Once this upgrade was accomplished the demonstration
developed for this thesis could be modified slightly and used as a working, multilevel
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communications network to support wargaming and research in a multilevel secure
environment.
4. Demonstration of GEMSOS Security Mechanisms
The fourth task, of this thesis was to demonstrate how GEMSOS would
enforce security mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information.
To demonstrate the enforcement of security mechanisms, a scenario was developed
with planned attempts at security violations. Specifically, attempts were made to
transmit messages to terminals at lower access levels (attempting to violate integrity)
and attempts were made to read messages written at higher access levels (violation of
compromise). In each case the system manager was able to interrupt the transmission
and stop any violation of security. These tests were meant to demonstrate, rather than
to prove that information security are preserved. They are in no way intended to be
exhaustive, however, they allow for a series of observations to be made concerning
system security.
C. SYSTEM TESTING
The test phase was designed to demonstrate particular security features of the
model guard interface system. It was not intended to prove that the security of the
system could be violated, but to demonstrate the security mechanisms enforced in the
GEMSOS environment. Testing consisted of two major areas.
First, communications were established between users having the same access
level. Messages were passed between the two terminals via the multilevel
communications process. Initially, the multilevel system manager was created to
coordinate the communications between two unclassified users. The system manager
assigned the access classes of the TDS terminals and all information passed between
the two was encrypted, transmitted, received, and decrypted by the system manager.
The second area was to test the enforcement of security rules as discussed in
previous sections. To test this, TDS terminals were attached to ports with different
access classes and the system manager assigned access classes to the TDS processes at
or below the access class of the port. When messages were sent between the TDS
terminals, the trusted process enforced the rules of compromise and integrity, and upon
detecting a security violation it would issue the appropriate error message to the
originator. In this case the security check consisted of a comparison of the incoming
message header, with the system manager defined destination access level. The error
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message interrupted the normal sequential passing of messages, to inform the
originator that the destination of his message did not have the proper access level to
receive the message.
Each TDS terminal operated independently, simulating being located at two
different activities. They could send and receive messages from different physical ports,
and communicate to each other using different external ports. Inter-process
synchronization was accomplished by allowing only one terminal to send a message at
a time. Once a terminal's message transmission was completed, control was passed to
the other terminal to allow it to display the incoming message. This technique was
chosen to facilitate testing. It is not the only method which could have been used.
This technique would not be adequate for real-time communications flow. The
software developed for this demonstration would have to be modified and updated with
a view toward pipeline processing, making maximum use of the multi-processor Gemini
system. The multiple microcomputers in a Gemini system are capable of
multiprocessing as well as multiprogramming. Depending on the requirements of the
application, the GEMSOS can multiplex processes onto a single processor or distribute
them among several processors to support combinations of parallel and pipeline
processing. A timed polling scheme with all terminals operating simultaneously would
be appropriate and would be an avenue to take this particular application for further
study.
D. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
The following sections provide a set of observations based upon the experience of
developing a trusted application on the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base.
1. Applications Development with GEMSOS
Development of applications programs in a secure environment is more
complicated than development in a nonsecure environment. Applications development
tools such as example programs, demonstrations and libraries greatly speed up the
process of preparing an application for the secure environment. Successful compilation
and linking are the first step for development. Once linked with the appropriate
modules, an application still has no security associated with it. To assign a security
classification and prepare the program to execute in GEMSOS, a secure volume must
be created by running the system generation (SYSGEN) program. This process places
the application in the segment structure recognized by GEMSOS and creates a
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bootable system segment structure on a formatted volume. The key to proper use of
the SYSGEN program is identification of the segment structure in which the
application will be placed. The segment structure includes the boot-strap, the kernel,
the application code, and data segments. Understanding the format of your
application is very important for system generation.
As with any new area of study, multilevel security has its own terms and
concepts which must be thoroughly understood prior to implementation. As discussed
in Chapter II, the manner in which the Gemini system manages resources is not like
unsecure systems. The interaction of the process, segment and device management
functions is key to understanding overall system operation.
Another step in the education process for secure applications development is
the rigid control that the secure operating system must maintain over subjects and
objects. A programmer cannot think in terms of "read" and "write" as in typical
PASCAL programming. Commands such as these compile successfully, but cause
trapping in the secure operating system. Once the programmer understands the
restrictions of a secure environment and develops the "mind set" for programming of
secure applications, the development of secure applications becomes routine.
Gemini provides applications development packages with their machines to
make the development environment more friendly. Libraries, utilities and
demonstrations are constantly being updated and revised as developments in secure
technology are made. Any programmer with experience with 8086 or 80286 system
programming and an understanding of high order languages can easily adapt to
programming in the GEMSOS environment.
2. Development of Applications Using ADA
This section addresses the question: "How can a trusted computer system
architecture be defined so that untrusted software applications programs can be coded
in ADA and DoD security policy still be enforced ?"
The 'Orange Book' requires that a system be divided into two pieces, the
trusted computing base and the untrusted software. The trusted computing base is
responsible for enforcing the system security policy. System security is independent of
the untrusted software. Models of DoD security include the concepts of subject and
object. The trusted computing base must assure that all accesses of subjects to objects
adhere to the system policy. How can security subjects be defined in a system using
ADA programs so that this is possible?
69
The ADA task, is the active entity in an ADA program. Therefore, the task is
the obvious candidate for a subject. However, selection of an ADA task as the subject
leads to problems. In general, different tasks within the same ADA program can
communicate bidirectionally in the following ways:
• They can rendezvous.
• They can read and change global data.
• They can use a common global package, which might change data that is
private to the package.
• They can open, read, write, and close the same devices.
In most security models, each subject can be assigned a different security level. But
two way communication between tasks at different security levels would violate the
security policy. Thus, if different tasks in the same program are different subjects at
different levels, the kernel must eliminate the two way communication between them.
It must mediate each rendezvous, mediate access to shared global data, mediate access
to global packages, and it must assign devices separately to separate tasks in a
program. This type of approach becomes somewhat complicated. A direct approach
to the solution is the use of a trusted subject to control each access or communication.
The Gemini system does this by using the kernel as the trusted process and using the
ADA task as an application built over the GEMSOS kernel. Tasks in different
programs can communicate using the host operating system interprocess
communications mechanisms. The system is as secure as the host operating system;
system security is as independent of ADA as it is any application development
language.
3. Computer Security for Marine Tactical Data Systems
The protection of information processed, stored and transmitted by Marine
tactical data systems is vital to Marine Air Ground Task Force safety and imposes
stringent requirements for system security. This protection is provided by hardware
and software features, physical security measures, procedural security, and access
controls. These features must provide in-depth protection of sensitive information as
well as ensuring the integrity of transmitted data.
Presently we can have only limited security because of the untrusted
components. Currently, security is enforced using only restrictive security policies and
procedures such as:
• System high modes of operation.
• Dedicated modes of operation.
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• Controlled modes of operation.
We must continue to build trusted perimeters around the untrusted components,
subsystems and systems using methods which provide security when information is
created such as:
• Trusted smart terminals.
• Trusted PCs.
• Trusted workstations.
• Trusted network interfaces.
• Trusted gateways
We must also provide security when information is released outside the security
perimeter such as:
• Trusted guards.
• Trusted network interfaces.
• Trusted front end processors
These protection mechanisms come as "add-on" type security. We cannot limit
ourselves to this "band-aid" approach. We must begin to develop "built-in" security.
In order to do this we must think from the ground up. This can be done by designing
and building systems consisting of untrusted components and trusted components
developed together to form trusted systems, and by building completely trusted systems
by using all trusted components from conception. Future security of Marine tactical
data systems requires that we understand our needs, develop a rigid security policy and
develop our command and control systems with security in mind from conception.
4. Integrated Security Requirements
Total security of Marine tactical data systems is the integration of:
• Physical security through the proper use of access controls and creating a
secure environment.
• Personnel securitv with all personnel having appropriate clearances and "need-
to-know".
• Administrative securitv to include a rigid securitv policv, appropriate





Every aspect of system security must be reviewed to make the Marine Corps' command
and control structure secure. We cannot think in terms of physical security alone. The
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security policy must be an integrated, well thought out plan protecting against every
vulnerability. Figure 4.2 from the 1967 Joint Computer Conference shows what we are
up against when evaluating the vulnerabilities of any information processing system.
Secure front end processors, trusted guards, encryption, and physical security are all
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Figure 4.2 Computer System Vulnerabilities.
E. SUMMARY
The demonstration of a trusted interface between tactical data systems developed
in this thesis met or exceeded all design goals. Messages were passed between two
remote terminals simulating tactical data systems in a manner that ensured security
from unauthorized access at both source and destination. Encryption was used to
maximize security between terminals. By varying the access class of each TDS
terminal, it was possible to demonstrate the system's ability to detect and respond to
security voilations. Flexibility in determining system configuration allows for
modification of system parameters to meet a variety of requirements. Finally, by using
modular programming techniques, the application may be altered to fit various




The multilevel secure interface designed in this thesis was developed to
demonstrate the secure interface between untrusted, single level tactical data systems
operating at different security levels. The system developed is capable of supporting
the control of the dissemination of information either with or without the presence of a
security officer. The principle security mechanism demonstrated is the enforcement of
integrity and compromise by a reference monitor (security kernel) implemented by the
Gemini Secure Operating System.
Most of the Marine Corps' tactical data systems rely solely on a physical security
perimeter, protecting the computer and its users by guards, fences and other means.
Communications between computer and remote devices may be encrypted to
geographically extend the security perimeter. When only physical security is used, all
users can potentially access all information in the computer system. Consequently, all
users must be trusted in the same degree. When the system contains sensitive
information that only certain users should access, additional protection mechanisms
must be placed in the system. One solution is to give each class of users a separate
machine. This solution is becoming increasingly less costly because of declining
hardware prices. However, the proliferation of computers and the networks to
interconnect them means that in the future, the potential users of many computers will
include individuals not authorized access to much of the growing amount of valuable
and sensitive information they contain.
It is becoming increasingly clear that in the future, many computers will need
interconnections to other computers in order to do their jobs. JCS Pub 1, Jan 86
defines interoperability as:
The condition achieved anions communications-electronics svstems, or items of
communications-electronics equipment, when information or services can be
exchanged directly and satisfactorilv between them and,' or their users.
The increasing number of tactical data systems in the Marine Corps and all of the
services leads to the absolute need to connect in some way to pass the wealth of
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information to and from the multitude of subscribers. Information is becoming a
national resource and protecting information is vital. Advanced tactical data systems
facilitate the exchange of information, but unless they address the controlled sharing of
information among users, the information could easily do us as much harm as good.
Sharing information from a computer requires internal controls to isolate sensitive
information from unauthorized users. The notion of controlled sharing implies that it
is possible to define what controls on sharing are desired. This definition constitutes
the security policy. Thus, in addition to defining interoperability of tactical data
systems there must be a security policy defined as well.
There are two types of security policy: mandatory and discretionary. A
mandatory policy contains security rules which are imposed on all users. A
discretionary policy, on the other hand, contains security rules that can be specified at
the option of each user. The protection policy enforced by a security kernel is
encapsulated in a set of rules that constitute a formal security policy. Today the
security kernel is the only available technology for demonstrating secure computer
systems of practical proportions. During the past decade the maturation of this
technology and the improvements in software engineering and microelectronics make
the security kernel practical and affordable. The Marine Corps has a workable
solution to the computer security problem through the use of a secure kernel as a
guard between untrusted systems or as a trusted front end process linking tactical data
systems at multiple levels of security.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Integration of JAMPS into GEMSOS
JAMPS is a portable set of computer controlled equipment for assisting
operators in composing and exchanging JINTACCS formatted messages. JAMPS was
used in the demonstration as an untrusted process solely for the creation of
JINTACCS messages. It is recommended that JAMPS be fully integrated into
GEMSOS and be run as a trusted process. Transport of the JAMPS software onto a
trusted machine would establish a secure, multilevel workstation for creation, storage,
and communication of JINTACCS formatted messages.
2. Implementation of a Polling Scheme
The current communications process created for this demonstration used an
event driven environment which onlv allowed one terminal to have control at anv
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particular time. The establishment of an interrupt driven environment could make
maximum use of the multiprogramming and multiprocessor environment of GEMSOS.
A polling scheme or an interrupt driven environment would allow each terminal
process more access to the multiple processors in the Gemini system and would create
a more real time, secure communications system.
3. Modern Programming Techniques
The technique of top down, sequential programming was used for this
demonstration. This was simply due to inexperience with working with a
multiprocessor system. A completely different approach must be used to take full
advantage of the Gemini multiple microprocessor environment. Techniques such as
parallel, pipeline, and concurrent processing must be used for applications
development. A new "mind set" must be established to think of these advanced
techniques when developing applications. A topic recommended for further study is





Access - A specific type of interaction between a subject and an object that results in
the flow of information from one to another.
Access Level - The combination of the security level and the integrity level of a subject
or object.
Audit Trail - A set of records that collectively provide documentary evidence of
processing used to aid in tracing from original transactions forward to related records
and reports, and/ or backwards from records and reports to their component source
transactions.
Bell-LaPadula Model - A formal state transition model of computer security policy that
describes a set of access rules. In this formal model, the entities in a computer svstem
are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects. The notion of a secure state is
defined and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from
secure state to secure state; thus, inductively proving that the svstem is secure. A
system state is defined to be "secure" if the ohlv permitted access modes of subjects to
oojects are in accordance with a specific security policy. In order to determine whether
or not a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the
classification of the object and a determination is made as to whether the subject is
authorized for the specific access mode. The clearance/ classification scheme is
expressed in terms of a lattice.
Category Set - A category set, part of a securitv level, is a list of information categories
applicable to an object or subject. Categories correspond roughly to the topic areas of
the information. A subject must be cleared for all categories on' an object to read the
object.
Channel - An information transfer path within a system. Mav also refer to the
mechanism by which the path is effected.
Compartment - Compartments are a mutuallv exclusive wav to assign cateeories. If an
object is compartmented, then it generally has only one categorv, called a
compartment. Compartments are used mostlv in the intelligence communitv. Thev are
implemented in a kernel-based system using categories.
Computer - Anv device capable of storing and processine information and, if linked by
a network, of communicating with other computers. Computers used in this manner
are commonly referred to asT-Iosts, as contrasted with those used in communications
applications, called Switches.
Controlled - Some users having neither a security clearance nor a need-to-know for
some .information processed by the system, but separation of users and classified
material not essentially under operating system control.
Covert Channel - A communication channel that allows a process to transfer
information in a manner that violates the system's security policy.
Dedicated Securitv Mode - All svstem (Computer or Network) equipment used
exclusively by thai system, and all users cleared For and having a need-to-know for all
information processed by the system.
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Descriptive Top-Level Specification (DTLS) - A top-level specification that is written in
a natural language, an informal program design notation, or a combination of the two.
Discretionary Access Control - A means of restricting access to objects based on the
identitv of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are discretionary
in the 'sense that a subject
w
with a certain access permission is capable of passing tha't
permission on to another subject.
Discretionary Security - The aspect of security policy implementing the "need-to-know"
requirement for access to information.
Domain - A set of objects that a subject has the ability to access.
Flow Control - A strategy for protecting the contents of information objects from being
transferred to objects at improper access levels.
Formal Top-Level Specification (FTLS) - A Top-Level Specification that is written in a
formal mathematical language to allow theorems showing the correspondence of the
system specification to its requirements to be hypothesized and formally proven.
Formal Verification - The process of using formal proofs to demonstrate the
consistency between a format specification of a svstem and a formal security policy
model or Between the formal specification and its program implementation.
Mandatory Access Control - A means of restricting access to objects based on the
sensitivity of the information contained in the objects and the formal authorization of
subjects to access information of such sensitivity.
Multilevel - Some users having neither a security clearance nor a need-to-know for
some information processed bv the system: separation of personnel and material
accomplished by the operating system and associated software.
Multilevel Device - A device that is used in a manner that permits it to simultaneously
process data of two or more security levels without risk of compromise. To accomplish
this, sensitivity labels are stored on'the same physical medium and in the same form as
the data being' processed.
Multilevel Secure - A class of svstem containing information with different sensitivities
that simultaneously permits access bv users with different security clearances and
needs-to-know. but prevents users from obtaining access to information for which thev
lack authorization.
Network - An entity composed of anv of a number of communications media used to
link Computers and" transfer information.
Non-discretionary (Mandatory) Security - The aspect of DoD security policy which
deals with security levels. A security level is comprised of a security classification and
one or more categories of access re'striction. Classifications are totally ordered while
categories are partially ordered. To access a piece of information, a us'er must have a
classification greater than or equal to the classification of the information, and at least
all of the categories of access restriction of the information.
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Object - A passive entity that contains or receives information. Access to an object
potentially implies access to the information it contains. Examples of objects are:
records, blocks, pages, segments, files, directories, directory trees, and programs, as well
as bits, bvtes, words, fields, processors, video displays,' keyboards, clocks, printers,
network, nodes, etc.
Process - A program in execution. It is characterized by a single current execution
point and address space.
Read - A fundamental operation that results only in the flow of information from an
object to a subject.
Reference Monitor Concept - An Access control concept that refers to an abstract
machine that mediates all access to objects by subjects.
Security Kernel - The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a Trusted
Computing Base that implement the reference monitor concept. It must mediate all
accesses, be protected from modification, and be verifiable as correct.
Security Policy - The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an organization
manages, protects, and distnbutes sensitive information.
Sensitivity Label - A piece of information that represents the security level of an object
and that describes the sensitivity of the data in mat object. Sensitivity labels are used
by the TCB as the basis for mandatory access control decisions.
Single-Level Device - A device that is used to process data of a single security level at
any one time. Since the device need not be trusted to separate data of different
security levels, sensitivity labels do not have to be stored with the data being processed.
Subject - An active entitv, generally in the form of a person, process, or device that
causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state. Technically, a
process/domain pair.
System - A collection of two or more computers linked by a network.
System High - All equipment protected in accordance with requirements for the most
classified information processed bv the system. All users cleared to that level, but
some not having a need-to-know for some of the information.
Top-Level Specification - A non-procedural description of svstem behavior at the most
abstract level. Typically a functional specification that' omits all implementation
details.
Trusted Computer Svstem - One which emplovs sufficient hardware and software
integntv measures to "allow its use for processing' simultaneously a range of sensitivity
or classified information.
Trusted Computing Base - All of the protection mechanisms within a computer svstem
(hardware, firmware, and software) which enforce a security policv on that computer.
It creates a basic protection environment and provides additional user service required
for a trusted computer system.
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Trusted Network. Base - All the protection mechanisms within a network which enforce
a security policy on that network-
Trusted System - One which emplovs sufficient hardware and software integrity
measures to allow its use for proces'sing simultaneously a range of sensitivity or
classified information.
Verification - The process of comparing two levels of system specification for proper
correspondence (e.g., securitv policv model with top-level specification, TLS with




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AADCCS - Army Air Defense Command and Control System
AAW - Antiair warfare
ABIC - Army Battlefield Interface Concept
ACE - Aviation Combat Element
ADOC - Air Defense Operations Center (NATO)
AFATDS - Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (Army)
AMASS - Advanced Marine Airborne SIGINT System
AOC - Air Operations Center (Navy)
ARTADS - Army Tactical Data System
ASCII - American Standard Code for Information Exchange
ATACC - Advanced Air Tactical Command Central
ATF - Amphibious Task Force
Btry - Battery
BUCS - Backup Computer System
C3 - Command, Control and Communication
CAS - Close Air Support
CCP - Communications Control Panel
CDU - Control and Display Unit (GPS)
CLF - Commander Landing Force
COMSEC - Communication Security
DASC - Direct Air Support Center
DCC - Display Control Console (PLRS)
DSCS - Defense Satellite Communications System
DSD - Dynamic Situation Display
EMCON - Emission Control
FAMDS - Field Artillery Meteorological Data System
FASC - Fire and Air Support Center
FDC - Fire Direction Center
GPS - Global Positioning System
IAC - Intelligence Analysis Center (MAGIS)
JAMPS - JINTACCS Automated Message Preparation System
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JINTACCS - Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
LFICS - Landing Force Integrated Communications System
MAB - MArine Amphibious Brigade
MACCS - Marine Air Command and Control System
MAGIS - Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System
MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task. Force
MATCALS - Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System
MIFASS - Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System
MPIC - MIFASS-PLRS Interface Controller
MRAALS - Marine Remote Area Approach and Landing System
MTACCS - Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control Systems
MTDS - Marine Tactical Data System
NCCS - Navt Command and Control System
PLI - Position Location Information
PLRS - Position Loation Reporting System
REAL FAMMIS - Real-Time Finance and Manpower Management Information
System
SIGINT - Signals Intelligence
TAC - Tactical Air Commander
TACC - Tactical Air Command Center
TACFIRE - Tactical Fire Direction System (Army)
TAOM - Tactical Air Operations Module
TCC - Tactical Communications Center
TCO - Tactical Combat Operations System
TDS - Tactical Data System
TERPES - Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation Svstem
(MAGIS)
TIC - Technical Interface Concept
TVVSEAS - Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System




This Demonstration simulates a secure multi-level system manager and two
unsecure TDS terminals. The unsecure TDS terminals may create JINTACCS
formatted messages by transferring control to a PC operating the JINTACCS
Automated Message Preparation System (JAM PS) and may then transmit and receive
messages from other TDS terminals.
All messages must first pass through the trusted system manager. The system
manager computes a checksum on the message header, which consists of the source
and destination, the access classes, the message number and the number of blocks in
the message. The checksum and the message are encrypted and transmitted to the
destination system manager (guard). All messages must first pass through the system
manager. The receiving system manager computes a checksum on the message and
compares this checksum with the checksum that was sent along with the message. If
the two checksums are not exactly the same, the message cannot be transferred to a
TDS terminal. The encrypted checksums will not match if the message contents or
clearance level has been modified during the transmission of the message. If the
checksums are the same, the message is sent to the TDS terminal, if the file's clearance
level is the same or less than the TDS terminal.
The demonstration uses the standard loader and login processes. The standard
loader process creates a system manager. The system manager creates the two
processes that actually implement the demonstration. The two processes that
implement the TDS terminal utilities of the demonstration are called the TDS
terminal utility pocesses.
The system manager attaches the Local SIO port 100, which must be connected
to a terminal, so it can prompt the operator to input parameters such as how
many terminals the demonstration will use, the ports to attach as transmit and
receive devices and the size of the message buffers.
The trusted process attaches the GSIO ports and 3, for reading and writing,
so that the TDS processes may display a menu of options to the operator. The
operator is allowed to input, transmit and display messages. Each TDS process
also attaches an LSIO port to allow a PC running JAMPS to allow it to create the
JINTACCS formatted messages.
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When an operator requests to input a message, control is shifted to the PC and
a JINTACCS message may be created using JAMPS. Once the message is input
control is shifted back, to the TDS terminal and the menu returns allowing the
terminal to transmit the message to another terminal through the system manager.
When the system manager transmits the message to another TDS terminal,
control is shifted to that terminal allowing it to display the message. That terminal
now has control and may create a message to be transmitted, and the cycle continues
until a security violation creates an error or one of the terminals logs off the network.
Control is then shifted back to the system manager and the process may begin again.
The menu that the TDS terminal displays is:
Enter mode desired
I = INPUT MESSAGE
D = DISPLAY MESSAGE
X = TRANSMIT MESSAGE
E = LOGOFF
ENTER MODE HERE
The "INPUT" option allows the operator to shift control to the PC running
JAMPS and create a JINTACCS formatted message. Once the message is created,
control shifts back to the terminal and the operator is prompted for the
destination terminal. If the operator enters a destination terminal with an improper
access level, an error message is sent to the system manager and the message
"IMPROPER DESTINATION TRY AGAIN" is displayed on the TDS screen. After
the proper destination has been entered, the original menu reappears.
The "TRANSMIT" option allows the operator to attempt to send a message.
When the operator selects "X", control is shifted to the system manager and the
system manager is prompted for an encryption key. Once the key is entered the
message is encrypted, transmitted, received, and decrypted. If there has been no
security violation the message is placed in the destination terminal's read buffer and
control is shifted to the destination terminal. The menu now appears on his screen
and the operator may enter "D" to display the received message. If the operator tries
to retrieve a message that does not exist, the error message, "INCOMING
MESSAGE BUFFER EMPTY" is displayed.
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The following is a list of all the segments used in this demonstration
(segments are listed using pathnames):
5 Mentor segment for all segments used for demo.
5,0 System manager code segment.
5.2 TDS1 terminal utility code segment.
5.3 TDS2 terminal utility code segment.
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APPENDIX D
SYSTEM MANAGER PROGRAM LISTING
The source code for the system manager is written in in PASCAL MT+. With
the exception of GUARD-CON.ZLI (Appendix F) and GUARD-TYP.ZLI (Appendix
G), all include files are library utility files which were delivered as part of the
development environment for the Gemini operating system. Information concerning
how to invoke library functions is contained in [Ref. 20]. Once the source file is
compiled, the required modules are linked together by using the GUARD.KMD file
with the PASCAL MT+ linker. A listing of this file is provided as Appendix E. Upon
completion of the linking process, the resulting GUARD.CMD must be prepared to
run in the Gemini Secure Operating System (GEM SOS) environment. This is
accomplished by operating the system generation (SYSGEN) program and using the
GUARD.SSB submit file provided as Appendix M. Procedures for operating the
SYSGEN program are contained in [Ref. 19]. Once the secure volume is created, the
Gemini system is reinitialized using the secure volume. This begins the execution of
the system manager process.
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r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ******* * * ******* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MODULE -- GUARD.PAS
DATE -- 6 FEBRUARY 1987
AUTHOR -- G. E. RECTOR CAPT/USMC
ADVISOR -- T. J. BROWN MAJ/USAF
PURPOSE -- This module is initialized as a multi-
level process which allows a terminal attached to port
to simulate the multilevel TIMS workstation as the system
manager. It allows the system manager to configure and
operate a multilevel secure interface between TIMS and
single level, untrusted terminals
simulating untrusted tactical data systems. Once
the system is initialized, configured and tested, it runs
independently allowing remote terminal users to transmit
messages via the multilevel secure interface.
****************************************************************)
module guard;
( constant include files }
const
{Si gate-con.zli} {Gate constant include file}
(Si rl-con.zli} {Ring 1 constant include file}
{Si guard-con.zli} (Application constant include file}
{ type include files }
type
{Si gate-typ.zli} (Gate type include file}
(Si lib-typ.zli} (Library type include file}
(Si rlp-typ.zli} (Ring 1 type include file}
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{Si kst-typ.zli} (Known segment table type include file}
(Si guard- typ.zli} (Application type include file}
{ library include }
(Si io-dec.zli} (I/O integer manipulation include file}
(Si io-hex.zli} (I/O hexidecimal include file}
{Si seg-mgr.zli} (Segment manager include file}
(Si gate.zli} (Gate include file}
(Si lib.zli} (Library include file}
(Si lib-b24.zli} (Library include file}
(Si io-str.zli} {I/O string manipulatin include file}
r **********************************************
Procedure: input_param
Purpose: This procedure allows the system
manager to input parameters necessary to setup and test
system operation.
****************************************************************!
procedure input_param( class : access_class;
var sys_rec : sysmgr_rec;







putln(w_dev,'PLEASE ENTER THE SYSTEM PARAMETERS');












putln(w_dev,'CHILD SIZE IS ');
putdec(w_dev,sys_rec.ch_size);
putln(w_dev,' ');
putln(w_dev,'BUFFER SIZE IS 100 BYTES');
sys_rec.b_size:= 100;
putln(w_dev,' ');





putln(w_dev,'ENTRY MUST BE WITHIN ACCESS RANGE');
for i: = 1 to num_term do begin
putstr(w_dev,'TERMINAL ');
putdec(w_dev,i);













putln(w_dev,'ENTER 8 CHARACTER INITIAL CRYPTO KEY (NO ECHO)');






*** fixed parameters *** }
{ code segment entry numbers }
sys_rec.chld_ent[l]: = 2;
sys_rec.chld_ent[2]: = 3;
putln(w_dev,'ENTRY OF PARAMETERS IS COMPLETE);
end; {input_param}
Procedure: sys_config
Purpose: This procedure configures the external
communication ports identified in parm_input for port to
port communications with flow control. They are attached
to read and write sequentially 8 bytes at a time to be
compatible with the data encryption device.
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ******* * * * * * * *
\
/







begin { sys_config }
config_sUc:= false;
putln(w_dev,'CONFIGURING TRANSMIT AND RECEIVE PORTS');
{ attach xmit and recv ports for computer to computer communications }
(
»** fill-in attach_device calling arguments *** }








rd_parm. sior.max: = 8;
rd_parm.sior.delim_active: = false;
attach_device(rd_dev,recv_slt,rd_parm,success);
show_err(' RECEIVER ATTACH ERROR'.success);
{


















Purpose: This procedure checks communications in
both directions by transmitting a test string of data. Once

















*** transmitter access_class for comm test *** }
\VT_class.compromise: = init.resources.max_class.compromise;
wr_class.integrity: = init.resources.min_class.integrity;
putstr(w_dev,'TEST MESSAGE IS ');























Purpose: This procedure uses four process local
device slots to attach the required encryption and
decryption devices. Crypto key and feedback key are pro-
vided in the procedure call. Devices are attached using
the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode.









begin ( att_crypto }
att_crypto_suc: = false;
{




ren_parm.ren.blk_size: = 8; { 8 bytes per blk }
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attach_device(rendev,ren_slt,ren_parm,success);
show err('ATTACH READ ENCRYPTION DEVICE ERROR'.success);








show_err('ATTACH WRITE ENCRYPTION DEVICE ERROR',success);
{









show_err( ATTACH READ DECRYPTION DEVICE ERROR'.success);




{ wde_parm is blank record }
attach_device(wdedev,wde_slt,wde_parm.success);
show_err( ATTACH WRITE DECRYPTION DEVICE ERROR',success);
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att_crypto_suc: = true;
end; { att_crypto }
r ***************************************************************
Procedure: crypto_tst
Purpose: This procedure verifies that the
encryption and decryption devices are working properly.
A test string is encrypted then decrypted using test
keys. Results are output to the tims terminal. When











begin { crypto_tst }
crypto_tst_suc: = false;
putln(w_dev,'BEGIN ENCRYPTION DEVICE TEST');
wr_class.compromise: = ink.resources.max_class.compromise;
wr_class. integrity: = init.resources.min_class.integrity;
putstr(w_dev,'ENCRYPTION TEST STRING IS ');
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*** write test string to encryption device *** }
write_sequential(wen_slt,addr(encryptin),8,wr_class, success);
show_err('WRITE ENCRYPTION SIOW ERROR'.success);
{
*** read encrypted string *** }
read_sequential(ren_slt,addr(encryptout),size,rd_class, success);
show_err('READ ENCRYPTION SIOR ERROR',success);
putstr(w_dev,'ENCRYPTED STRING IS ');
for i: = 1 to 8 do
if (ord(encryptout[ij) > = 40) and




*** write encrypted string to decryption device *** }
write_sequential(wde_slt,addr(enciyptout),8,wr_class, success);
show_err('WRITE DECRYPTION SIOW ERROR',success);
{
*** read decrypted string *** }
read_sequential(rde_slt,addr(decryptout),size,rd_class, success);
show_err('READ DECRYPTION SIOW ERROR'.success);
putstr(w_dev,'DECRYPTED STRING IS ');













Purpose: This procedure creates a single level
child process for an untrusted tds using the parameters
specified by the system manager. The child process
code segment is a single level utiity program which attaches
the child process at the desired physical port. Four seg-
ments are passed to the child process. The stack segment
contains the ch_init:rl_process_def record. The two
common message buffer segments (inbuf and outbuf) are used
to pass messages between the parent and child processes.
Finally a code segment is required for all child processes.
Process local segment numbers as well as pointers to the
message buffer segments are passed back to the main pro-
cedure when the child process has been created.































begin { term_proc_create }
term_create_suc: = false;
{





r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ********* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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create, makeknown, and swapin child segments
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **********
\
{ makeknown terminal utility code segment located at child
entry number specified in sysmgr.ssb file }
seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[root_ofiset],chld_entry,
ch_cde_seg_num[j],r_e,size,class, success);
show_err('MAKEKNOWN CHILD ENTRY ERROR',success);
{ Determine required size for stack. It must be large
enough required information for child initialization.}
seg_mgr_bytes: = sizeof^stack_header) + sizeofl;kst_header)
+ (sizeoi\kst_entry)*init.num_kst);
stack_size:= rl_stack_size + vect_size+ seg_mgr_bytes - 1;
{
*** create, makeknown, and swapin child stack segment *** }
seg_create(ch_cde_seg_num[j],0,stack_size, success);
show_err('CREATE CHILD STACK ERROR',success);
seg_makeknown(ch_cde_seg_num[j],0,stk_slot[j],r_w,size,
class, success);
show_err('MAKEKNOWN CHILD STACK ERROR'.success);
swapin_segment(stk_slot[j], success);
show_err('SWAPIN CHILD STACK ERROR'.success);
{ stack eventcount is used to notify sys mgr that the
terminal process is activated. It is also used as an
entry in the ch_init record }
read_evc(stk_slot[j],stk_evc_val[j], success);
show_err('READ STACK EVC ERROR'.success);
stk_evc_val[j] : = stk_evc_val[j] + 1;
{
*** create message buffers *** }
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{ incoming message buffer }
seg_create(ch_cde_seg_num[j],2,buf_size,success);







*** fill in ch_seg_list *** }
{ ch_seg_list determines order in which segments are passed








*** fill in child init record *** }
{ ch_init record is placed on stack for use by child







ch_init.resources. priority: = init.resources. priority- 10;
lib_integer_to_b24(chld_size,ch_init.resources.memory);
ch_init.resources.processes: = 2;
ch_init.resources, segments: = 90;
{ min_class and max_class determine the access level of
the child process. Since the terminal process is single
level, they are the same. Levels are specified by the
sysmgr during the parm_input initialization. }





*** create stack pointer *** }
{ stack pointer is offset to start of rl_process_def
}
stk_ptr.seg: = lib_mk_sel(ldt_table,stk_slot[j],l);
stk_ptr. off: = stack_size-(vect_size + seg_mgr_bytes
+ sizeof^rl_process_def)) + 1;
stk_init_ptr: = stk_ptr.p;
{ copy ch_init on to stack }
move(ch_init,stk_init_ptr ,sizeo^rl_process_deO):
{ create pointers to message buffers }




{ fillin remaining records for create_process call
}
{ child address record }
{ a maximum of 5 segments may be passed in ch_addr_array }
for i: = to 4 do begin
ch_addr_rec[i].segment_number: = ch_seg_list[i];
{ code segment must be of type read_execute }
{ others are type read_write }





{ swapin allsegments except root_offset }
if i = 2 then begin








*** child register record *** }
ch_reg_rec.ip: = S80;
ch_reg_rec.sp:= stk_ptr.ofT;




ch_reg_rec.vec_ofT: = stack_size-vect_size + 1;
{ *** child resource record *** }
{ child 1 is located at ch_res_rec.chld_num= }
ch_res_rec.child_num: = chld_num- 1
;
ch_res_rec.priority: = ch_init.resources. priority;
ch_res_rec.memory: = ch_init.resources.memory;
ch_res_rec.processes: = ch_init.resources.processes;







show_err( CREATE CHILD PROCESS ERROR',success);
{ wait for child process to advance stack, eventcount




putstr(w_dev, 'AWAITING STACK VALUE ');
putdec(w_dev,stk_evc_val[j]);
putstr(w_dev, 'CURRENT STACK VALUE '); ******************
putdec(w_dev,DEBUGl); USED FOR DEBUGGING
DUtlnfw dev "V ******************




show_err( 'AWAIT STACK ADVANCE ERROR', success);
read_evc(ch_cde_seg_num[j],DEBUG 1 .success);
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putln(w_dev,'CODE VALUE AFTER AWAIT ');
putdec(w_dev,DEBUG 1 );
putln(w_dev,"); '
DEBUG1 := outbuf_ptr[j] ;
show_err('CHILD ATTACH FAILED ', DEBUG1);
putln(wdev,'CHILD PROCESS CREATED);
term_create_suc: = true;
end; { term_proc_create }
r ***************************************************************
Procedure: xmit_rec
Purpose: This procedure takes the message stored
in the outgoing buffer of the source terminal, encrypts
each block, and transmits it sequentially via the
appropriate external communications port. The crypto-
graphic is provided by the sysmgr_rec. The fb_key is
initially input by the system manager. (Then the encrypted
block becomes the fb_key for the next block.) At the receiver
the message is decrypted and stored in the incoming message
buffer of the destination terminal. Access levels of the
msg and dest are compared. If they do not match the msg
is not delivered, and an error msg is returned to the
source.
******* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *********** *************** * * * * * *
\
































*** retrieve message stored in originator's outgoing msg buf ***}
move( o_out_ptr ,out_rec,sizeof^ out_rec));
(
*** fill in remaining address block, entries *** }
( outgoing message number }
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out_rec.num: = mt_mess_num;
{ message classification }
out_rec.block[l][6]: = chr(ch_parm.ch_access[orig_term].
compromise[0] + 48);
{ insert message number in address block }
binascii(int_mess_num,4,str_mess_num,'0');
for i: = 1 to 3 do
out_rec.block[l][i + 2]: = str_mess_num[i];
{ increment message number counter }
int_mess_num: = int_mess_num+ 1;
putln(w_dev, 'ENTER THE 8 CHARACTER ENCRYPTION KEY.');










for i: = 1 to out_rec.num_blk do begin
{ in cbc mode crypto devices must be reattached to transmit
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each block, this is required because the previous encrypt-
ed block, is used as the fb_key to encrypt the next block.}
att_crypto(ch_parm.key,fb_key,proc_suc);
{ write to encryption device }
write_sequential(wen_slt,addr(out_rec.block[i]),8,xmit_class, success);
show_err('WRITE ENCRYPTION SIOW ERROR'.success);
{ read encrypted text
}
read_sequential(ren_slt,addr(encryptout), size,class,success);
show_err('READ ENCRYPTION SIOR ERROR'.success);
{ transmit encrypted block }
wTite_sequential(xmit_slt,addr(encryptout),S,xmit_class, success);
show_err(TRANSMIT ERROR'.success);
{ determine fb_key for next block }
for j: = 1 to 8 do





{ receiver access class }
recv_class: = ch_parm.ch_access[dest_term];









{ write to decryption device }
write_sequential(wde_slt,addr( decrypting 8,recv_class,success);
show_err('WRITE DECRYPTION SIOW ERROR'.success);
{ read decrypted text
}
read_sequential(rde_slt,addr(decryptout),size,class,success);
show_err('READ DECRYPTION SIOR ERROR\success);
putln(w_dev,'DECRYPTED MESSAGE IS');
for j:= 1 to 8 do begin
in_rec.block[i][j]: = decryptout[j];
if (ord(decryptout[j]) > = 40) and




{ count is number of blocks in received message }
count: = count + 1; %






r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ********* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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message transmitted and received
* * * * *************** ********** * * * ************************* * ******>
{ insert number of blocks into incoming record }
in_rec.num_blk: = count;

















{ compare message and destination access levels for
possible security violation }
if mess_comp < > dest_comp then begin
( if srce= '0' then incoming message is an error
message concerning a security violation }
if srce < > '0' then begin
putln(w_dev,'SECURITY VIOLATION MESSAGE NUMBER');




{ prepare error msg for transmission }
err_msg(srce,d_out_ptr,proc_suc);
end else begin
{ if incoming traffic is an error msg then




{ reset recv_suc }
recv sue: = true;
end;
end else begin
{ if no violation, move msg into incoming msg







Purpose: In the event of a security violation,
this procedure fills destination outgoing buffer with
an error message. This error message is then transmitted











{ error msg has only an address block }
err_rec.num_blk: = 1;
{ source of '0' indicates an error message }
err_rec.block[l][l]: = '0';
err_rec.block[l][2]: = dest;
( remainder of address block is empty }
for i: = 3 to 8 do
err_rec.block[l][i]:= '0';
{ move error message to outgoing buffer of dest term




















Purpose: This procedure is called to display
the success code of the resource management call if it is
other than zero. If the success code indicates no_error













end; { show_err }
f ***************************************************************
Procedure: main
Purpose: This procedure initializes system
operation. It performs comm and crypto checks and then
creates a single level process for the remote terminal.
Once the system is on-line, it controls access to the
external communications ports. Messages are transmitted
and received, and security checks are performed on all
incoming traffic.
*********************************************
procedure main( var init : rl_process_def);
var




























if (success < > no_error) then begin




putln(w_dev,'SYSTEM MANAGER TERMINAL ATTACHED);
{ call procedure to enter system parameters }
temp_class.compromise : = init.resources.max_class.compromise;
temp_class.integrity : = init.resources.min_class. integrity;
input_param(temp_class,mgr_rec,proc_suc);




{ configure xmit/recv ports }
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sys_config( temp l_port,temp2_port,proc_suc);
( test comm channel pass 1 }
comm_tst( init,temp l_port,temp2_port,proc_suc);
( reconfigure xmit/recv ports to transmit in opposite dir }
sys_config(temp2_port,templ_port,proc_suc);
{ test comm channel pass 2 }
comm_tst(init,temp2_port,templ_port 1proc_suc);
{ attach crypto devices in CBC mode }
att_crypto(mgr_rec.key,mgr_rec.key,proc_suc);
{ test crypto devices }
crypto_tst(init,proc_suc);
putln(w_dev,'SYSTEM INITIALIZATION COMPLETE');
{ loop to create child process for each remote terminal
}
for i: = 1 to num_term do begin
ch_num: = i;











putstr(w_dev,'CHILD PROCESS CREATED TERMINAL ');
putdec(w_dev,i);
putln(w_dev,' ');




{Initial message destination is terminal 2.}
mess_dest:= 2;
mess_num: = 0;
{ To start systam advance inbuf_evc for terminal 1.}
advance(bufm_slt[l], success);
show_err( 'START SYSTEM INBUFFER ADVANCE ERROR', success);
hhPP { initialize message receipt success value }
recv_suc: = true;
/ ***************************************************************
begin independent system operation loop
*************************************************
while true do begin
{ inner loop synchronizes terminal to terminal communications
}
for i : = 1 to num_term do begin
mess_srce: = i;
mess_num: = mess_num+ 1;
{ check, for received message security violation }
if recv_suc = true then begin
{ if no error then wait for next outgoing message }
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putstr(w_dev, IN LOOP AWAITING VALUE ');
putdec(w_dev,bufout_evc[i]);





show_err( 'AWAIT MESSAGE READY FOR TRANSMIT',success);
putln(w_dev,' MESSAGE READY FOR TRANSMISSION');






{ notify message source that message was xmit }
advance(bufin_slt[mess_srce], success);
show_err( ADVANCE SOURCE INBUF ERROR'.success);
{ check, for received message security violation }
if recv_suc = true then begin
{ if no error then notify dest terminal




show_err('ADVANCE DEST INBUF ERROR'.success);
putln(w_dev,'MSG RECVD AND DELIVERED');
{ new dest term is message srce }
mess_dest: = i;
end else begin
{ if security violation did occur then
transmit error msg back to source, error
msg has already been placed in outgoing






{ notify source of incoming error message }
advance(bufin_slt[mess_srce], success);
show_err('NOTIFY SRCE OF ERROR ADVANCE',success);
end; {if}
end else begin
{ if received message had a security violation the
loop will return control to the message s.ource so
that he can display the error message }














Date: 7 February 1987
Author: G. E. RECTOR, JR., CAPT/USMC
Advisor: T. J. BROWN, MAJ/USAF
Purpose: This program is used when linking GUARD.
It eliminates the need to manually enter each of the file
names each time a new version or update of the program
is compiled.
****************************************************************!
guard = rl-init, guard, rllib/s, paslib/s/p:80
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APPENDIX F
GUARD-CON.ZLI INCLUDE FILE OF CONSTANT DECLARATIONS
/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *********** * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Program: GUARD-CON.ZLI
Date: 7 FEBRUARY 1987
Author: G. E. RECTOR, JR., CAPT/USMC
Advisor: T. J. BROWN MAJ/USAF
Purpose: This file is developed as an include file and
contains constant declarations used for the multilevel inter-
face application program. This file must be included in the












root offset = 2;
pb oil set = 3;
oufbuf_offset = 3;
inbuf_ofifset = 4;
r ********************* _„j of crnard-con zli **********************)
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APPENDIX G
GUARD-TYP.ZLI TYPE DECLARATION INCLUDE FILE
j ***************************************************************
Program: GUARD-TYP.ZLI
Date: 7 FEBRUARY 1987
Author: G. E. RECTOR, JR, CAPT/USMC
Advisor: T. J. BROWN, MAJ/USAF
Purpose: This file was developed as an include file of
type declarations to be used with each module of this application.
****************************************************************\
sysmgr_rec = record
comm_port : array [1..2] of integer;
b size : integer;
ch"_size : integer:
ch access : arrav [L.num term] of access_class;





num blk : integer;
blocK : array [r..mess_buf_size] of array [1..8] of char;
end;
ch_array = array [l..num_term] of integer;
( ***********************
en(^ aunrd-tVD zli ***********************\
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APPENDIX H
TDS1 TERMINAL UTILITY PROGRAM LISTING (JANUS ADA)
The TDS1 terminal utility package is compiled and prepared for execution in
almost the same manner as the system manager module. By modifying certain
parameters which are identified in the program listing, the system manager may specify
the specific port and terminal number of each remote terminal process. TDS.CMD
files are created for each terminal attached and are essentially identical except that
TDS1 is written in Janus ADA and TDS2 is written in PASCAL MT + . Each is
compiled, linked, and sysgened separately, but perform identically. A TDS1.CMD file
is submitted with the GUARD.SSB file for each remote terminal attached. To attach
additional terminals, (as more ports become available), entry numbers would have to
be specified in the GUARD.SSB file. Janus ADA is compiled and linked in a manner
very similar to PASCAL MT-K A library file was created providing the ring and
ring 1 calls similar to those developed by Gemini for PASCAL MT-K A listing of the
library file DEFS.lib and the package body DEFS.PKG to support that library are
listed as Appendices I and J.
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WITH agate, agatej, arl, alib, alibj, strlib, util, defs;
PACKAGE BODY TDS1 IS
USE agate, agatej, arl, alib, alibj, strlib, util, defs;
*************************************************
-- Program: TDS1
-- Date: 11 FEBRUARY 1987
-- Author: G. E. RECTOR CAPT/USMC
-- Advisor: MAJ. T. J. BROWN MAJ/USAF
— Purpose: This program is initiated when the system
— manager creates the single level TDS process. It allows
— the TDS operator to enter and send messages via the system
— manager process, as well as display incoming messages.
— Message specifications and terminal access level are deter-
-- mined by the system manager process and passed to the TDS
— process in its rl_process_def record. Other system constants
-- are provided in the guard-typ.zli and guard-con.zli files.
— Incoming and outgoing buffers are used to store messages.
— Eventcounts for these segments are used to synchronize system
— communications.
*****************************************************************
-- Constants used by this program :
t_phys_dev : CONSTANT Integer := 100;
pc_dev : CONSTANT Integer := 101;
term_num : Constant Character := T;














~ initialize terminal process parameters
Xmit_buf_stat : = False;
Mode := "0";
-- sys_start= false for twerminal 1 only all
- other terminals should have sys_start = true
Sys_start:= (Term_num = "1");
Inbuf_evc := 0; -- attach terminal as read/write device
Attach(T_phys_dev,W_dev, False,Success);
If (Success /= No_error) Then
Debug : = Success;
Swapin_segment( Ink. Initial_seg(Outbuf_offset), Success);
Debugptr : = Lib_mk_pntr(Ldt_tabie,Init.Initial_seg(Outbuf_ofFset),l);
Debugptr : = Debug;
End If;
Attach(T_phys_dev,R_dev,True,Success);
If (Success /= No_error) Then







— stack eventcount is advanced to notify




-- loop until operator enters 'e' to indicate logoff
While Mode /= "e" Loop
— inbuf_evc is used to have the terminal wait after
— transmitting a message until a reply is received
— from the dest term. It is initially advanced for
-- terminal 1 to start the system and then is advanced
-- upon receipt of an incoming message
Inbuf_evc:= Inbuf_evc + 1;
Await(Init.Initial_seg(Inbuf_ofTset),Inbuf_evc,Success);
Show_err("AWAIT INCOMING MESSAGE",Success);
— sys_start is used to avoid the 'display incoming
— message' prompt at terminal 1 when the system is
— started. Once the system is operating it will
— always be true
If Sys_start Then
Rec_buf_stat : = True;
Putln(W_dev,"DISPLAY INCOMING MESSAGE");
End If;
Sys_start : = True;
-- inner loop is used to indicate that a
-- message has been sent and alert the operator
— that the terminal is waiting for a reply
While (Mode /= "X") Loop
- help menu consists of a display of term








When 2 - >
Putln(W_dev,"CONFIDENTIAL");
When 4 = >
Putln(W_dev,"SECRET");




Putln(W_dev,"I = INPUT MESSAGE");
Putln(W_dev,"D = DISPLAY RECEIVED MESSAGE");
Putln(W_dev,'X = TRANSMIT MESSAGE");
Putln(W_dev,"E = LOGOFF");
Putln(W_dev," ");
Putstr(W_dev, 'ENTER MODE HERE");
Getchar(R_dev,Mode);
If (Mode > = "a") And (Mode < = "z") Then
Mode := Character Val(Type_name'Pos( Mode)
- Type_name'Pos("a") + Type_name'Pos("A"));
End If;
If Mode = "I" Then
If Xmit_buf_stat = False Then
— enter message to be stored in
-- outgoing message buffer
Input_mess( Ink. Resources. Min_class,
Init.Initial_seg(Outbuf_ofiset),Xmit_buf_stat);
Else
Putln(W_dev,"MESSAGE WAITING TO BE TRANSMITTED")
End If;
ElsifMode = "D" Then
If Rec_buf_stat = True Then
Putln(W_dev,"ENTERING DISPLAY MODULE");







ElsifMode = "X" Then












Putln(W_dev,"MODE ENTRY ERROR, TRY AGAIN");
End If; -- end of inner loop-exit after msg xmit
End Loop;
Putln(W_dev,"WAITING FOR INCOMING MESSAGE");
— reset mode selection value
Mode := "0";
End Loop;
Putln(W_dev,"END OF TDS TERMINAL PROCESS");
Detach(W_dev);






DEFS.LIB LIBRARY DEFINITION FILE
WITH agate, asatei. arl, alib, alibi, strlib, util;
PACKAGE DEFS IS
USE agate, agatej, arl, alib, alibj, strlib, util;
num_term : CONSTANT Integer := 2;
mess buf size : CONSTANT Integer : = 4;
r de^: CONSTANT Integer := 0?
w dev : CONSTANT Integer := i;
T-phvs dev : CONSTANT := 100;
PC dev-: CONSTANT := 101;
xmit sit : CONSTANT Integer := 6;
recv'slt : CONSTANT Integer := 7;
wen sit : CONSTANT Integer := 2;
ren "sit : CONSTANT Integer := 3:
wde sit : CONSTANT Integer := 4;
rdejslt : CONSTANT Integer := 5;
stack offset : CONSTANT Integer := 0;
code "offset : CONSTANT Integer := 1;
root offset : CONSTANT Integer := 2;
pb offset : CONSTANT Integer := 3;
oufbuf offset : CONSTANT Integer := 3;
inbuf_offset : CONSTANT Integer : = 4;
TYPE sysmgr_rec IS record
comm_port : array (1..2) of integer;
b size : integer;
ch"_size : integer;
ch access : array (1..num term) of access_class;
chld_ent : array (l..num_Ferm) of integer;
kev : bufS;
END RECORD;
TYPE Table IS ARRAY (1..8) of CHARACTER;
TYPE buf_rec IS record
num : integer;
num blk : integer;
block": arrav (f..mess buf size) of Table;
END RECORD; " "
Procedure Jamps_setup;
Procedure Jamps_unhook;
PROCEDURE put_ln ( Idev : in integer; w_class : in access_class;
str : in string );
PROCEDURE put_str ( ldev : in integer; \v_class : in access_class;
str : in string );
PROCEDURE put_dec( ldev : in integer; w class : in access_class;
dval : in integer
-
);
PROCEDURE put_succ( in_str : in string; dec_val : in integer;
w_class : in access_class );
PROCEDURE get_ln( ldev : in integer; r_class : out access_class;
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str : out string );
Procedure Input_mess (class : in access class:
comm_buff : in Integer;
buf_stat : out boolean);
Procedure Xmit_mess (inbuf_slot : in Integer;
outbuf_slot : in Integer;
inbuf eve : in Integer;
xmitjbuf_stat : out Boolean);
Procedure Disp_mess (comn_buf : in Integer;
rec_buf_stat : out Boolean);
Procedure Logoff ( ink : in rl_process_def);




DEFS.PKG PACKAGE BODY FILE USED TO SUPPORT DEFS.LIB
pragma ranaecheckCofD; pragma debug(ofr); pragma arithcheck(ofT);
pragma enumtab(off);
WITH aeate, asatej, arl. alib, alibi, strlib, util;
PACKAGE kOD\ defs IS





Att rec : attach struct;
Att_rec.dev_name : = sior;
Att_rec. sior_rec.dev_num : = Pc_dev;
Att_rec.sior_rec.dev_tvpe := Io;
Att rec.sior rec.dev id:= r_dev;
Att_rec.sior_rec.mrr:= Bvte( \6U04DU );
Att_rec.sior_rec.mr2 := Byte( 16??035# );





Put succ("REALTDEViCE DETACH ERROR ",Success,W_class);
ExiFWhen (Success = No_error);
End Loop; — Repeat Loop
Loop
Attach device(Att rec. Success);
Put succ( "PC DEVICE ATTACH ERROR ",Success,W_class);
ExifWhen (Success = No_error);
End Loop: -- Repeat Loo_p







Att_rec.dev_name : = sior;
Att_rec.sior_rec.dev_num := T_phys_dev;
Att_rec.sior_rec.dev_tvpe := Io:
Att_rec.sior_rec.dev id:= R dev:
Att_rec.sior_rec.mrr:= Bytef 16#04D?* );
Att_rec.sior_rec.mr2 := Bvte( 16»03E?? );




Detach device(R dev. Success);
Put succfPC DEA'ICE DETACH ERROR ",Success.W_class);
ExifWhen (Success = No_error);




Put succ( "READ DEVICE ATTACH ERROR \Success,W_class);
ExifWhen (Success = No_error);
End Loop: -- Repeat Loop
Putln(W_dev,W_class/'READ DEVICE ATTACHED ");
End Jamps_unhook.;
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ******* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
PROCEDURE put_ln ( ldev : in integer; w class : in access_class;
str : in string ) TS
— put a string on device ldev with cr and If
out_buf : string( 82 );
success : integer;
wt_sio : wt seq_struct;
size str : integer;
CR" CONSTANT integer := 13;
LF : CONSTANT integer := 10;





size str : = length( str );
outT^f : = out_buf & char_to_str( character'val( CR ));
out_buf := out_buf & char_to_str( character'val( LF ));
wt sio.device : = ldev;
wt~sio.data_ofT:= outbufADDRESS + 1;
wt_sio.data seg:= get ss();
wt_sio.count : = size_sfr + 2;
wt sio. class : = \v_class;
write sequential( wt_sio, success );END put_In;
*************************************************************
PROCEDURE put_str ( ldev : in integer; w class : in access_class;
str : in string )TS
— put a string on device ldev.
out_buf : string;
success : integer;




size_str : = length( str );
wt sio. device : = ldev;
wt~sio.data_ofT : = out_bufADDRESS + 1;
wt_sio.data seg:= get ss();
wt_sio.count := size_sfr;
wt sio. class := w_class;
write sequential( wt_sio, success );END put_str;
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ******* * * * ******* * * * * * * * *
PROCEDURE put_dec( ldev : in integer; w class : in access_class;
dval : in integer") IS
— put the string equivalent of a integer on the terminal screen.
out_buf : string( 10 );
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BEGIN
out_buf := Int_to_str( dval );
put_str( ldev, w_class, out_buf );END put_dec;
*************************************************************
PROCEDURE put_succ( in_str : in string; dec_val : in integer;
w_class : in access_class ) IS
-- print a string and an integer on device attached in slot STDIO_W
— (should be a serial terminal).
BEGIN
put_str( STDIO W w_class, in_str );
put dec( STDIO" W, w class, dec val );




PROCEDURE get_ln( ldev : in integer; r_class : out access_class;
str : out string ) IS
-- Assumes ldev attached for single character reads.
« Reads a string one character at a time.
— Automatically echoes out STDIO_W.
-- Handles backspaces. Terminates on CR or after 80 input chars.
— Ignores control chars other than BS and CR.
CR : CONSTANT integer := 13;
LF : CONSTANT integer := 10;
BS : CONSTANT integer := 08;






temps : string^ 3 );
BEGIN
str_size : = 0;
in char : = 0;
rcTsio.data_oiT: = in_char'ADDRESS;
rd_sio.device := ldev;
rd sio.data seg:= get ss();
LOOP " 6 5 *
.
read_sequential( rd_sio, rd ret. success );
IF ( success = no error )THEN
in char := L~and( in char, 16#7F# ); -- turn-off high bit.
IF( in char = BS jTHES7
IT ( str_size > ) THEN
str_size := str_size - 1;
temps( ) : = character'vaU 3 );
temps( 1 ) : = character'val( BS );
temps( 2 ) := ' ';
temps( 3J := character'val( BS );
put str( STDIO W, rd ret. class, temps );
ENDTF;-





) : = character'val( 2 );
} := character'van CR );
) := character'val( LF T;
put str( STDIO W, rd ret. class, temps );
ELSIF ( character valCin_char ) IN ' \.' ' fTHEN
str size := str_size + 1;
injbuf^ str_size ) : = character'val( in_char );
134
temps( CM : = character'vaK 1 );
temps( I) : = character'val( in_char );
put str( STDIO W, rd ret. class, temps );END IF" "
END IF:
EXIT WHEN (( str_size > = 80 ) OR ( in_char = CR ) OR
( success / = no error ));END LOOP;
in_buf{ CM : = character'val( str_size );
str : = injbuf;




— Purpose: This procedure allows the operator
— to input a message into the outgoing message buffer.
-- Characters are input into 8 byte blocks so that they
— will be compatible with the data encryption device.
— The character 'S' is used to indicate the end of the
— message. The intial block is reserved for the










7-8]: number of blocks in msg
— Source.destination, and number of blocks are entered
— in this procedure. Remaining entries are filled in
— by the sysmgr process prior to transmission.
****************************************************************
Procedure Input_mess (class : in access class;
commjburf : in Integer;
buf_stat : out boolean) Is
Mess_rec : Buf_rec;
Blk_cnt : String;









— create pointer to star! of input buffer
Input_ptr:- Lib_mk pntr(Ldt_table,Comn_buf,l);
Temp_ptr : = Input plr;
Clr screen! Proc sucl;
PutTn(W dev,\Vclass,"BEGIN JINTACCS AUTOMATED
MESSAGE PREPARATION PROCESS. ");
Putln(W_dev,W_class," "); — initialize msg block counter
Charin : = Character'Val(O);
Jamps setup(Class); -- begin character entry loop
While XCharin / = Character'Val(12)) And (1 /= Mess_buf_size) Loop
— block 1 is addr, block 2 is strt of msg
i := i + 1; — begin loop to read" 8 char for each block
For i In 1..8 Loop









End Loop; - For Loop — for
End Loop;
— while
— insert sentinel at end of buffer in case input
-- buffer size was exceeded
Mess_rec.Block(Mess_buf_size)(8) := "$";
— count keeps track of number of blocks input
Count := i;
-- fillin address block source,dest,and num_blk
Mess_rec.Num blk := Count;
Mess_rec.Block"(lXl) : = Term_num;
Jamps unhook:
Putln(W dev.W class." ");
Putin}W~dev,W-class,"ENTER DESTINATION TERMINAL NUMBER");
GetcharfR_dev,R class, Mess_rec. Block( 1 )( 2 V);
While (Mess rec.Block(l){2) = Term num) Loop
Putln(W dev.W class/TMPROPER DESTINATION TRY AGAIN");
GetcharfR dev,R_class,Mess_rec.Block(l)(2));
End Loop: — while
Putchanw dev.Mess rec.Block(l)(2));
Putln(W dev,W classT' ");
Binascii(Count.37Blk_cnt,' 0");
For i In 1..2 Loop
Mess_rec.Block(r)(i + 6) := Blk_cnt(i);
End Loop; — For Loop








— Purpose: This procedure alerts the svstem manager
-- process that the operator desires to transmit the message
-- stored in the outgoing message buffer. This is done by
— advancing the outbufeventcdunt. The svstem manager process
-- notifies the terminal process that the message has been sent
— by advancing the input buffer eventcount.
****************************************************************
Procedure Xmit_mess (inbuf_slot : in Integer;
outbuf_slot : in Integer;
inbuf eve : in Integer;




-- notifv svsmgr, msg readv to xmit
Advanced Outbuf slot,Success f;
Put_succ("OUTPUT ADVANCE ERROR",Success,W_class);
— await svsmgr xmit complete notification
Inbuf eve := Inbuf eve + 1;
AwaifXInbuf_slot,InBuf_evc,Success);
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Put succ("AWAIT INPUT BUFFER ERROR" Success.W class):
PutIh(Wdev,W class,"MESSAGE TRANSMISSION COMPLETE");




— Purpose: This procedure displays the
— message stored in the incoming "buffer segment. It
— is similar in structure to input_mess.
****************************************************************
Procedure Disp_mess (comn_buf : in Integer;








— create pointer to incoming message buffer segment
Disp_ptr := Lib_mk_pntr(Ldt_table,Comn_buf,l);
Clr screen(Proc sue);
PutTn(W_dev.\\rclass,"BEGIN DISPLAY OF RECEIVED MESSAGE");
-- place contents of incoming message buffer into
— aisprec
Move(E>isp_ptr,Disp_rec.Sizeof7Disp_rec));
— check incoming message for error message which
— is indicated by a source' of '0'
— if no error message then begin display
IfDisprec.Block(l)U) '= "0" Then
Putstr(W dev, MESSAGE FROM TERMINAL ");
Putchar(W dev.Disp rec.Block(l)(l));
Putln(W dev,W class." "):
Putstr(\T dev,"MESSAGE NUMBER: ");
PutcharlW dev,Disp_rec.Block( 1 )(3)1
Putchar(\V~dev,Disp rec.Block( 1)(4)
Putchar(W"dev.Disp rec. Block( 1 ) 5)
Putln(W dev,W class." ")•
Putln(W-dev,\V-class."MfeSSAGE FOLLOWS --");
Putln(W3dev,W-class," ");
i := 2; -- output inbuf contents to terminal
WhilelD_char / = "S")And(i/= Mess_buf_size) Loop
For j In 1..8 Loop
IfD char/= "S" Then
Putchar(W dev,Disp rec.Block(i)(j));
D_char :=~Disp_rec."Block(i)(j);
End If; -- if
End Loop; -- For Loop -- for
i := i + 1;
End Loop; - while
Else
Putln(W dev,W class/'MESSAGE FROM SYSTEM MANAGER");
Putin W-dev.W-class/'SECURITY VIOLATION");
Putin W-dev,W-class,"IMPROPER DESTINATION ACCESS");
PutlnjW-dev,W-class,"MESSAGE NOT DELIVERED");
End If: --if " ;
Putln(W dev,W class," ");
Putln(W"dev,Wj:lass,"END OF MESSAGE");





— Purpose: This procedure disables the TDS terminal
— and makes the resources assigned to that terminal process
~ available. No new terminal process is created to replace it.
****************************************************
Procedure Logoff ( init : in rl_process_def) Is
Sue,Success : Integer;
Begin -- loeoff
Putln(W_dev,W class/TERMINATING CHILD SEGMENTS");
— to reinitialize a terminal process at this terminal,
- process segments would have to be terminated prior




Self delete^ Init. Initial_see(Stack_offset),Success);
If (Success = No_errorJ'Then
Attach(T phvs_dev,W_devJfalse,Suc);
Attach(T~phvs dev,R dev,True,Suc);
Put succfchilcTseirdelete error' ,Success,W class);




— Purpose: Clears display screen.
****************************************************************
Procedure Clr_screen (proc_suc : out Boolean) Is
i : Integer;
Begin - clr screen
For iln 1..25 Loop
Putln(W dev,W_class," ");





TDS2 TERMINAL UTILITY PROGRAM LISTING
The TDS terminal utility module is compiled and prepared for execution in
almost the same manner as the system manager module. By modifying certain
parameters which are identified in the program listing, the system manager may specify
the specific port and terminal number of each remote terminal process. TDS.CMD
files are created for each terminal attached and are essentially identical except for
assignment of specific ports and terminal numbers, therefore, only the source code for
one terminal utility is provided. A TDS2.CMD file is submitted with the GUARD.SSB
file for each remote terminal attached. To attach additional terminals, (as more ports
become available), entry numbers would have to be specified in the GUARD.SSB file.
A listing of the TDS2.KMD file is included as Appendix L.
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Program: TDS1.PAS
Date: 7 FEBRUARY 1987
Author: G. E. RECTOR, JR., CAPT/USMC
Advisor: T. J. BROWN MAJ/USAF
Purpose: This program is initiated when the system
manager creates the single level TDS process. It allows
the TDS operator to enter and send messages via the system
manager process, as well as display incoming messages.
Message specifications and terminal access level are deter-
mined by the system manager process and passed to the TDS
process in its rl_process_def record. Other system constants
are provided in the guard-typ.zli and guard-con.zli files.
Incoming and outgoing buffers are used to store messages.
Eventcounts for these segments are used to synchronize system
communications.
$ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ******************)
module tds;
const




{ t_phys_dev = 5; physical port to which }
( terminal is attached }
term num = T;
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type














Purpose: This procedure allows the operator
to input a message into the outgoing message buffer.
Characters are input into 8 byte blocks so that they
will be compatible with the data encryption device.
The character 'S' is used to indicate the end of the
message. The intial block is reserved for the





blk[l][7-8]: number of blocks in msg
Source,destination, and number of blocks are entered
in this procedure. Remaining entries are filled in
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putln(w_dev,'ENTER MESSAGE TO BE TRANSMITTED);
putln(w_dev, ENTER A S TO INDICATE END OF MESSAGE);
putln(w_dev,' ');
{ initialize msg block, counter }
i:=l;
{ begin character entry loop }
while(charin < > 'S') and
(i < > mess_buf_size + 1) do begin
{ block 1 is addr, block 2 is strt of msg }
i: = i+l;
( begin loop to read 8 char for each block }
142
for j:= 1 to 8 do begin
if charin < > T then begin
getchar(r_dev,charin);
mess_rec.block[i][j]: = charin;
{ echo character input }
putchar(w_dev,charin);
end else
{ if charin = 'S' then pad the remaining





{ insert sentinel at end of buffer in case input
buffer size was exceeded }
mess_rec.block[mess_buf_size][8]: = 'S';
{ count keeps track of number of blocks input }
count: = i;










for i: = 1 to 2 do
mess_rec.block[ l][i + 6]: = blk_cnt[i];









Purpose: This procedure alerts the system manager
process that the operator desires to transmit the message
stored in the outgoing message buffer. This is done by
advancing the outbuf eventcount. The system manager process
notifies the terminal process that the message has been sent












{ await sysmgr xmit complete notification }
await(inbuf_slot,inbuf_evc + 1 ,success);
show_err('AWAIT INPUT BUFFER ERROR',success);






Purpose: This procedure displays the
message stored in the incoming buffer segment. It















putln(w_dev,'BEGIN DISPLAY OF RECEIVED MESSAGE');
{ place contents of incoming message buffer into
disp_rec }
move(disp_ptr ,disp_rec,sizeof^disp_rec));
{ check incoming message for error message which
is indicated by a source of '0' }
{ if no error message then begin display }







{ output inbuf contents to terminal
}
while (d_char < > '$') and
(i < > mess_buf_size + 1) do begin
for j:= 1 to 8 do begin



















Purpose: This procedure disables the TDS terminal
and makes the resources assigned to that terminal process







{ to reinitialize a terminal process at this terminal,
process segments would have to be terminated prior
to the self_delete call }






if (success < > no_error) then begin
attach(5,w_dev, false, sue);
attach( 5,r_dev,true, sue);





Purpose: This procedure is called to
display the success code of the resource mngmnt
call if it is other than zero. If the success code
indicates no_error then no message is output.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * # * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *********** ******>
J
procedure show_err( str: string; code:integer);
begin {show_err}





















Purpose: This procedure provides a menu for the
terminal operator. It monitors buffer status and calls
the appropriate procedure dependent on the mode selection.
***************************************************************** \
procedure main( var init : rl_process_def );
var
DEBUG : INTEGER; { Used for debugging }












( initialize terminal process parameters }
xmit_buf_stat: = false;
mode: = 0';
{ sys_start = false for twerminal 1 only all
other terminals should have sys_start = true}
sys_start: = false;
inbuf_evc: = 0;
{ attach terminal as read/write device }
attach(5,w_dev,false, success);









if (success < > no_error) then
begin






{ stack, eventcount is advanced to notify
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sysmgr that terminal is activated }
advance(init.initial_seg[code_ofTset], success);
advance(init.initial_seg[stack._offset], success);
show_err( 'STACK ADVANCE ERROR'.success);
{ loop until operator enters 'e' to indicate logoff}
while mode < > 'e' do begin
{ inbuf_evc is used to have the terminal wait after
transmitting a message until a reply is received
from the dest term. It is initially advanced for
terminal 1 to start the system and then is advanced
upon receipt of an incoming message }
await(init.initial_seg[inbuf_orTset],inbuf_evc + 1 ,success);
show_err( 'AWAIT INCOMING MESSAGE',success);
inbuf_evc: = inbuf_evc + I
;
{ sys_start is used to avoid the 'display incoming
message' prompt at terminal 1 when the system is
started. Once the system is operating it will
always be true }





{ inner loop is used to indicate that a
message has been sent and alert the operator
that the terminal is waiting for a reply }
while mode < > 'x' do begin
151
( help menu consists of a display of term











putln(w_dev,T = INPUT MESSAGE');
putln(w_dev,D = DISPLAY RECEIVED MESSAGE');





if mode = T then begin
if xmit_buf_stat = false then begin
{ enter message to be stored in




putln(w_dev,'MESSAGE WAITING TO BE TRANSMITTED');
end;
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end else if mode = 'D' then begin
if rec_buf_stat = true then begin
putln(w_dev,'ENTERING DISPLAY MODULE);







end else if mode = 'X' then begin












putln(w_dev,'MODE ENTRY ERROR, TRY AGAIN');




putln(w_dev,'WAITING FOR INCOMING MESSAGE);
{ reset mode selection value }
mode:= '0';
end; {while}
putln(w_dev,'END OF TDS TERMINAL PROCESS');
detach(w_dev);
detach(r_dev);






TDS2.KMD LINKING FILE FOR TDS2.PAS
( * * * * * * * * ******** * * * ********* * * * * ******************** ***********
Program: TDS2.KMD
Date: 7 February 1987
Author: G. E. RECTOR, JR., CAPT/USMC
Advisor: T. J. BROWN, MAJ/USAF
Purpose: This program is used when linking the
TDS2 terminal utilitv program after it is compiled. It
eliminates the need to mariuallv enter each of the file
names each time a new version or update of the program
is compiled.
****************************************************************!
tds2 = rl-init. tds2, rllib/s, paslib/s/p:80
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APPENDIX M
GUARD.SSB SYSTEM GENERATION SUBMIT FILE






















1. Klein. M. FL "Computer Security," Issues in C3I Program Management, Ed. Jon
L. Boyes, AFCEA International Press, 1984.
2. Peterson, J. L., and Siiberschatz, A., Operating System Concepts, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, 1985.
3. Department of Defense Computer Security Center, DoD Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria CSC-STD-OOl-83, Fort Meade, Maryland, 15 August
4. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D. C, U. S. Marine
Corps Command and Control Master Plan (C2MP), {Draft), December 1986.
5. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, Tactical Combat Operations
System Description Document, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California,
6. Marine Corps Tactical Svstems Support Activity, Technical Interface Concept for
Marine Tactical Systems', Marine Corps Base, 'Camp Pendleton, California, 12
September 1978.
7. Anderson, J. P., "Computer Security Technology Planning Study," ESD-
TR-73-5L Volume I and II, AD758206, AD7728067 James P. Anderson & Co.,
Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, October 1972.
8. Ames, S. R., Jr., "Security Kernels: A Solution or a Problem," Proceedings of the
1981 Symposium on Securitv and Privacy, IEEE Computer Societv Press, Los
Angeles, California, April 1981.
9. Woodward, J. P. L., "ACCAT Guard System Specification (Tvpe A),"
MTR-3634, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts, August 1978.
10. Woodward, J. P. L., "Applications for Multilevel Secure Operating Systems,"
1979 National Computer Conference, New York, New York, June 1979.
11. Anderson, J. P., On The Feasibility of Connecting RECON to an External
Network, Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, March 1981.
12. DifTie, W., and Hellman, M. E., "New Directions in Crvptology," IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, IT-22, 6 November 1976.
13. National Bureau of Standards, Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS
Publication 46, Data Encryption Standard, January 1977.
14. Davio, M., and others, "Analytical Characteristics of the DES," Advances in
Cryptology - Proceedings of Crypto 83, ed D. Chaum, Plenum Press, Inc., 1983.
157
15. National Bureau of Standards, Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS
Publication 81, DES Modes of Operation, 2 December 1980.
16. Vovdock, V., and Kent, S., "Security in High- Level Network Protocols,"
Computing Surveys, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1983.
17. Gemini Computers Inc., Monterev, California. System Overview, Gemini Trusted
Multiple Microcomputer Base, Version 0, May 1984.
18. Boebert, E., Kain, R., and Young, B., "Trojan Horse Rolls Up to DP Gate,"
Computerworld, 2 December 1985.
19. Gemini Computers Inc., Monterey, California, Sysgen User's Manual, June, 1986.
20. Gemini Computers Inc.. Monterey, California, GEMSOS Ring User's Manual
for the Pascal!MT+ 86 Language, July 1986.
21. Reed, D. P., and Kanodia, R. K., "Synchronization with Eventcounts and
Sequencers," Communications of the ACM', Vol. 22, No. 2, February 1979.
22. Brewer. D. J., A Real-Time Executive for Multiple Computer Clusters, Masters
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1984.
23. Digital Research, Inc., Monterey, California, CPM-86 Operating Manual, 1983.
158
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barnes, J. G. P., Programming In ADA, Addison-Wesley Publishers Limited, 1984.
Brand, S., "Environmental Guidlines For Using DOD Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria", Proceedings of the 7th DODiNBS Computer Security Conference,
September 1984
McMillan, B., DTST REPORT: Volume 5 "Battle Management, Command, Control,
Communication and Data Processing", October 1983.
Morgan, B.. "Considerations in Applying an Encryption Device to a Communications
Network," 1977 Conference on Computer Security and the Data Encryption Standard, U.
S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia, February 1978.
Peterson, J. L., and Siiberschatz, A., Operating System Concepts. Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, 1985.
Schell, R., and Tao, T. F., "Microcomputer Based Trusted Svstems For
Communication and Workstation Applications' , Proceedings 7th DOD/NBS Computer




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Librarv. Code 0142 2
Naval "Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Thomas J. Brown, Code 39 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
4. George E. RECTOR, Jr. 2
lOOlJLauran Place
Nokesville, Va 22123
5. Joseph S. Stewart. Code 55ST 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
6. C3 Academic Group, Code 74 2
Prof. M. K. Sovereign
Naval Postgraduate^SchooI
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7. Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code C4.CCA) 2
Headquarters Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380
8. Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code INTM) 2
Headquarters Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380
9. Chief, Command. Control and Communications Division (D 103 FT) 2
Marine Corps Development Center
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, VA 22134-3080
10. Chief, Intelligence Division 2
Marine Corps Development Center
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, VA 22134-5080


















A demonstration of atrusted computer inter-face between a multilevel









A demonstration of a
trusted computer inter-
face between a multilevel
secure command and coi-
trol system and untrusted
tactical data system.

